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ARTICLES
THE FALSE DUALITY OF EFFICIENCY AND
PREDATION IN THE ANALYSIS OF MONOPOLIZING
CONDUCT
Mark D. Anderson*
Section 2 of the Sherman Act' prohibits monopolization.2 The
offense of monopolization does not prohibit the mere possession of
monopoly power, but requires some culpable conduct by the defend-
ant.' Thus, it is this conduct requirement which distinguishes legal
from illegal monopolies. The nature of the conduct requirement has
troubled courts for decades.4
This article develops a definition of the conduct element which
is based on the recognition that the power element and the conduct
element operate at cross purposes. The scope of the conduct element
must be determined by analyzing the purposes of that element. Part
I of this article will set forth the nature of the dilemma posed by the
* B.A. 1973, Macalester College; J.D. 1977, University of Chicago; Professor of Law,
University of Idaho.
1. Section 2 of the Sherman Act (hereinafter Section 2) states:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
- guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. 11 1990).
2. Section 2 also prohibits attempted monopolization and conspiracies to monopolize. Id.
3. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements:
(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or devel-
opment as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.
Id.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff d per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
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two elements of the monopolization offense in the context of Learned
Hand's seminal opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America.' Part II will describe the solution to this dilemma proposed
by Judge Robert Bork which divides the universe of conduct by mo-
nopolists into two hemispheres, the efficient and the predatory. Part
III will analyze the position taken by the United States Supreme
Court during the last decade regarding the conduct element which is
based upon the dichotomy advanced by Judge Bork. Part IV will
explain why the efficiency-predation dichotomy advanced by Judge
Bork and adopted by the Court fails. Part V will set forth a defini-
tion of the conduct element which is based on the reasons for the
existence of that element.
I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
While much about antitrust law is subject to great debate, one
agreed upon premise is that, all other things being equal, competi-
tion is preferable to monopoly. The monopolization offense of Sec-
tion 2 is based upon this preference. Monopoly power allows a firm
to reduce output and raise prices above the level which would prevail
in a competitive market. This price increase has at least three conse-
quences. First, it effects a wealth transfer from consumers to produc-
ers. Second, it forces consumers who are unwilling or unable to pay
the higher prices to buy less attractive substitute products.' Third,
the monopoly profits earned by the monopolist may cause other firms
to expend resources to enter the market and these attempts may
cause the monopolist to spend its resources trying to repel such en-
try. 7 The wealth transfer from consumers to the monopolist is neu-
tral from the perspective of the net welfare of society. For every dol-
lar a consumer loses, the monopolist gains a dollar. The latter two
effects, however, are net losses to society. Welfare losses are incurred
without offsetting gains.8 Thus, even from a purely economic per-
spective, the preference for competition over monopoly is justified.
It is important to recognize that much of the welfare loss identi-
fied above flows merely from the exercise of monopoly power over
5. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
6. Throughout this article, the word "product" includes both products and services.
7. In some markets, consumers might be induced to spend resources trying to prevent
any producer from exercising monopoly power. Such expenditures would increase the cost of
monopoly. See John T. Wenders, On Perfect Rent Dissipation, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 456
(1987).
8. For a general discussion of the social cost of monopoly, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ECONOMICS AND FEDERAI. ANTITRUST LAW § 1.3 (1985).
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prices and is not dependent upon further conduct by the monopolist.
The consumers who respond to the monopoly price by switching to
inferior substitutes will do so regardless of other conduct by the mo-
nopolist. The same is true of potential producers who spend re-
sources attempting to enter the monopolized market. They are at-
tracted by the profits realized by the monopolist, not by any conduct
by the monopolist. Thus, both of these costs of monopoly exist
whether or not the monopolist engages in conduct deterring entry.
Because significant social costs flow from the exercise of monop-
oly power over prices even without further conduct by the monopo-
list, defining and applying the conduct element has been trouble-
some. The fundamental question is why harmful monopolies should
be legalized merely because the monopolist has not engaged in fur-
ther harmful conduct. In some settings, the conduct requirement can
be attributed to the nature of the proceeding. Section 2 provides that
the monopolization offense is a felony punishable by fines of
$10,000,000 for corporations and $350,000 for individuals and a
term of imprisonment of up to three years in prison.' Applying such
criminal penalties without some culpable conduct by the defendant is
inappropriate." Similarly, a violation of Section 2 gives rise to a pri-
vate cause of action for treble damages plus costs and attorneys' fees
under Section 4 of the Clayton Act." Since treble damages are in
part punitive, they would be inappropriate in the absence of culpable
conduct by the monopolist. 2
The conduct element, however, is part of the definition of the
monopolization offense. As such, it must be satisfied to establish mo-
nopoly liability in any procedural context, including a governmental
action seeking only injunctive relief. If the reasons for the conduct
element arose only in limited procedural contexts, it would not be an
element required to establish liability for the offense, but rather
would be an additional element required before relief was granted in
those limited contexts. Since the conduct element must be satisfied in
all procedural contexts, the explanation for its existence must not
depend upon the remedy sought. 3
Over four decades ago, Learned Hand struggled with the con-
9. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. I 1990).
10. 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW T 630b (1978).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988).
12. See 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 10, 1 630c.
13. Areeda and Turner concluded that the conduct element should be eliminated in gov-
ernmental actions seeking equitable relief against a substantial, persistent monopoly. 3
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 10, 1 623a.
1993]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
duct element of the monopolization offense in United States v. Alu-
minum Co. of America." In that case, the United States alleged that
Alcoa monopolized the production of virgin aluminum ingot in viola-
tion of Section 2 and sought its dissolution. 5 Because the United
States Supreme Court lacked a quorum of six justices qualified to
hear the appeal, the final decision was rendered by the three senior
judges of the relevant circuit, Learned Hand, Thomas W. Swan, and
Augustus N. Hand. 6 After facing difficult issues regarding the im-
pact of ingots made from scrap aluminum, imports and Alcoa's own
internal use of ingots to fabricate other products, Learned Hand,
writing for the court, concluded that Alcoa had monopoly power for
purposes of Section 2." The court then addressed the conduct
element.
The portion of the opinion addressing the conduct element first
sets forth a series of statements which characterize lawful conduct by
a monopolist. Some of those statements are then applied to the facts
of the case to reach a conclusion. Learned Hand's statements charac-
terizing lawful conduct by a monopolist are fundamentally inconsis-
tent. On one hand, he offers a number of characterizations of lawful
conduct which require passivity on the part of a monopolist. "[De-
fendant] may not have achieved monopoly; monopoly may have been
thrust upon it . . . .[P]ersons may unwittingly find themselves in
possession of a monopoly, automatically so to say . . .they may be-
come monopolists by force of accident."'" On the other hand,
Learned Hand offers an alternative characterization under which or-
dinary competitive acts would be lawful despite the fact that compet-
itors are eliminated and monopoly power results.
A single producer may be the survivor out of a group of active
competitors, merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and
industry. In such cases a strong argument can be made that,
although, the result may expose the public to the evils of mo-
nopoly, the Act does not mean to condemn the resultant of those
very forces which it is its prime object to foster: finis opus
coronat. The successful competitor, having been urged to com-
pete, must not be turned upon when he wins. 9
14. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (hereinafter Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 422-29.
18. Id. at 429-30.
19. Id. at 430.
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Learned Hand's conflicting characterizations of lawful conduct
by a monopolist reflect an underlying conflict about the role of the
conduct element. A characterization requiring a monopolist to be
passive virtually eliminates the conduct requirement. Such a charac-
terization would make any monopoly illegal if the monopolist en-
gages in any conduct which impacts an actual or potential competitor
adversely. The urge to reduce the conduct element to insignificance
rests on the realization that monopoly pricing imposes welfare losses
on society without further conduct by the monopolist. Learned
Hand's alternative characterization of lawful conduct by a monopo-
list would legalize many monopolies. This characterization would al-
low any act based on "superior skill, foresight and industry"2 as
well as any act which constitutes ordinary competition. Learned
Hand recognizes that such a characterization of the conduct element
"may expose the public to the evils of monopoly." 21
Because Learned Hand was addressing a concrete factual situa-
tion, he had to choose between his conflicting characterizations of the
conduct element. He chose the characterization requiring passivity. 2
During the period addressed by the record, demand for aluminum
grew rapidly. Alcoa expanded production to meet anticipated in-
creases in demand. Alcoa argued that this action constituted a com-
petitive act based on skill, which the process of competition en-
couraged, and, therefore, did not satisfy the conduct element.23
Learned Hand, however, held that Alcoa's expansion of capacity sat-
isfied the conduct element and violated the Act. In doing so, he char-
acterized the conduct element as creating a narrow exception to lia-
bility for "those who do not seek, but cannot avoid, control of a
market." '24 Obviously, this holding adopts a definition of the conduct
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. "It would completely misconstrue 'Alcoa's' position in 1940 to hold that it was the
passive beneficiary of a monopoly, following upon an involuntary elimination of competitors by
automatically operative economic forces." Id.
23. " 'Alcoa' avows it as evidence of the skill, energy, and initiative with which it has
always conducted its business; as a reason why, having won its way by fair means, it should be
commended, and not dismembered." Id. at 430-31.
24. Learned Hand:
We need charge it with no moral derelictions after 1912; we may assume
that all it claims for itself is true. The only question is whether it falls within
the exception established in favor of those who do not seek, but cannot avoid,
the control of a market. It seems to us that question scarcely survives its state-
ment. It was not inevitable that it should always anticipate increases in the
demand for ingot and be prepared to supply them. Nothing compelled it to keep
doubling and redoubling its capacity before others entered the field. It insists
that it never excluded competitors; but we can think of no more effective exclu-
1993]
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element which will almost always be satisfied.
Learned Hand's conflicting characterizations of the conduct ele-
ment reflect the dilemma which has proven so difficult to resolve in
the past. If the conduct element is defined in a way that allows a
monopolist to engage in competitive acts which adversely affect ex-
isting or potential competitors, society may be forced to suffer the ill
effects of enduring monopoly. If the conduct element is virtually
eliminated by defining it in such a way that it is always satisfied, a
monopolist will be condemned for engaging in acts which the process
of competition is designed to foster. Parts II and III will explore
attempts by Judge Bork and the United States Supreme Court to
resolve this dilemma. Both of these attempts base their definition of
the conduct element upon the reasons for prohibiting monopoly
rather than the reasons for legalizing some monopolies by operation
of the conduct element.
II. JUDGE BORK'S EFFICIENCY-PREDATION DICHOTOMY
The recognition that a monopolist's increase in price and reduc-
tion in quantity cause harm makes it difficult to defend the existence
of the conduct element when the grounds for defense are limited to
maximizing the net welfare of society. The conduct element legalizes
some monopolies which have increased price and reduced quantity.
This difficulty caused Areeda and Turner to urge that the conduct
element be eliminated in governmental actions seeking injunctive re-
lief against a substantial, persistent monopoly. a5
Judge Bork defines a version of the conduct element which he
argues maximizes the net welfare of society in his influential book,
The Antitrust Paradox.6 The first hurdle which a reader faces in
understanding Judge Bork's analysis is the label he applies to it: the
consumer welfare model.27 While the label implies a distinction be-
tween the interests of consumers and producers, the model values the
sion than progressively to embrace each new opportunity as it opened, and to
face every newcomer with new capacity already geared into a great organiza-
tion, having the advantage of experience, trade connections and the lite of per-
sonnel. Only in case we interpret 'exclusion' as limited to manoeuvres not hon-
estly industrial, but actuated solely by a desire to prevent competition, can such
a course, indefatigably pursued, be deemed not 'exclusionary.' So to limit it
would in our judgment emasculate the Act; would permit just such consolida-
tions as it was designed to prevent.
Id. at 431.
25. 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 10, 1 623a.
26. ROBERT" H. BORK, THE ANrITRusr PARADOX (1978).
27. Id. at ch. 5.
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interests of both groups equally. Judge Bork's explanation of his
model's treatment of the wealth transfer from consumers to produc-
ers caused by monopoly pricing makes this clear. When the price of
a product is increased from the competitive level to a monopoly level
some consumers either stop buying the product or buy less of it.
Consumers who continue to purchase, pay more per unit than they
would under competitive conditions. This increase paid on purchases
made at the monopoly price causes a wealth transfer from consumers
to producers. For society as a whole, the wealth transfer does not
affect total welfare because it merely transfers wealth from one
group in society, consumers, to another group, producers. Judge
Bork's consumer welfare model values the welfare of consumers and
producers in this situation equally. Judge Bork describes the wealth
transfer to producers "who are also consumers."28 In the lexicon of
Judge Bork's model, both consumers and monopolists are "classes of
consumers." 29 Thus, Judge Bork's consumer welfare model is a stan-
dard efficiency model measuring the net welfare of society.
Any approach to the monopolization offense of Section 2 based
upon maximizing the net economic welfare of society must confront
the net detrimental effects of monopoly pricing. At a minimum, these
effects include the losses suffered by consumers who would purchase
the monopolized product under competitive conditions but switch to
substitute products when faced with a monopoly price. The welfare
of these consumers is reduced without any offsetting gain to the mo-
nopolist, thus causing a net reduction in the welfare of society. Ac-
cepting any form of the conduct element legalizes at least some mo-
nopolies where these losses are possible. It was this prospect which
caused Areeda and Turner to recommend abolition of the conduct
element in governmental actions seeking equitable relief against a
substantial, persistent monopoly." This approach would make such
a monopoly illegal without regard to conduct adversely affecting
competitors in order to avoid the net welfare loss caused by monop-
28. Id. at 110.
Those who continue to buy after a monopoly is formed pay more for the
same output, and that shifts income from them to the monopoly and its owners,
who are also consumers. This is not dead-weight loss due to restriction of output
but merely a shift in income between two classes of consumers. The consumer
welfare model, which views consumers as a collectivity, does not take this in-
come effect into account. If it did, the results of trade-off calculations would be
significantly altered.
Id.
29. Id.
30. See supra text accompanying note 25.
19931
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oly. Judge Bork uses the same goal of maximizing the net welfare of
society to reach virtually the opposite conclusion. He asserts that sin-
gle firm monopoly power should almost always be lawful."
Understanding Judge Bork's approach to the conduct element
requires an understanding of his definition of predatory conduct. In
his view an act is predatory if it causes the monopolist to forego
profits in the present in order to increase or maintain its monopoly
power and earn monopoly profits in the future.
Predation may be defined, provisionally, as a firm's deliberate
aggression against one or more rivals through the employment
of business practices that would not be considered profit maxi-
mizing except for the expectation either that (1) rivals will be
driven from the market, leaving the predator with a market
share sufficient to command monopoly profits, or (2) rivals will
be chastened sufficiently to abandon competitive behavior the
predator finds inconvenient or threatening.3 2
Under this definition, predatory conduct is a present expenditure
which is profit maximizing because it affects the actors' monopoly
power, thereby yielding increased monopoly profits in the future.
Judge Bork uses this definition of predation in contrast with efficient
conduct, to create an efficiency-predation dichotomy. His approach
to the conduct element is based upon this dichotomy.
Judge Bork believes that self-adjusting mechanisms at work in
the marketplace cause the resulting monopolies to be better for the
net welfare of society than the alternative of dissolving the monopo-
list into competing firms.33 Judge Bork's argument has four compo-
nents. First, if a monopolist is restricting output, raising prices, and
making higher than competitive profits, potential entrants will dis-
cover this fact and attempt entry. Second, a potential entrant may be
excluded only by the superior efficiency of the monopolist or by acts
which are "predatory." '34 Third, predatory acts are very rare.35
31. BORK, supra note 26, at 160.
32. BORK, supra note 26, at 144. For an argument that a firm may gain monopoly
power without foregoing present profits by purchasing exclusionary rights from input suppli-
ers, see Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising
Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986); see also Douglas F.
Greer, "Understanding 'Raising Rivals' Costs' ": Comment, 34 ANTITRusr Bu.t. 895
(1989).
33. BORK, supra note 26, at ch. 8.
34. As stated earlier, Judge Bork uses the word predatory to mean acts which are profit
maximizing only because they enhance the monopololist's power over price in the future.
BORK, supra note 26, at 144.
35. BORK, supra note 26, at 144-60.
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Fourth, from the perspective of the net welfare of society, a monopo-
list which has survived by being more efficient than potential en-
trants, is preferable to competing firms resulting from the dissolution
of the monopoly because those competing firms would be no more
efficient than the potential entrants. The combination of these four
components leads to the conclusion that, in the absence of rare pre-
dation, a monopolist will either have its dominant position eroded by
entry, or will survive by providing society with products more
cheaply than the firms resulting from a judicially ordered
dissolution.
The analysis set forth in this article rejects Judge Bork's con-
tention that the universe of conduct by monopolists can be divided
into two sets, the efficient and the predatory, defining predation as
conduct which is profit maximizing only because of an impact on
future monopoly power. 6 Rejecting this contention requires rejecting
the premise that the conduct element can be defined based upon an
efficiency-predation dichotomy. 7 The other components of Judge
Bork's argument, however, are also subject to question. It may not
be universally true that potential entrants will always be able to dis-
cern when a firm with a high market share is making profits above
the competitive level. This is particularly the case for a monopolist
making numerous products, or where the monopolist's costs are not
easy to discover. Further, the issue of whether predation is common
or rare and the development of legal tests to detect it have been top-
ics of great scholarly and judicial debate. 8 Finally, in some markets,
firms resulting from a dissolution might be more efficient than new
entrants. This is particularly the case where the monopolist has val-
uable information which would be shared with some or all of the
firms resulting from a dissolution but is not available to new
entrants.
In summary, Judge Bork and Areeda and Turner adopt ap-
proaches to the conduct element of the monopolization offense based
on an efficiency rationale. Areeda and Turner conclude that a mo-
nopoly could be illegal without culpable conduct by the monopolist.
36. See infra Part IV.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 121-25.
38. See, e.g., Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1985); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983); Thomas J.
Campbell, Predation and Competition in Antitrust: The Case of Nonfungible Goods, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1987) (reviewing predation literature); Frank H. Easterbrook, Preda-
tory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHi. L. REv. 263 (1981); Lawrence A. Sullivan,
Monopolization: Corporate Strategy, the IBM Cases, and the Transformation of the Law, 60
TEX. L. REv. 587 (1982).
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Judge Bork, on the other hand, concludes that the conduct element
should be defined based upon an efficiency-predation dichotomy in
such a way that few monopolies would be illegal. The analysis set
forth in this article concludes that the conduct element is not based
upon an efficiency-predation dichotomy. Part III of this article will
analyze the Supreme Court's application of the conduct element in
cases which reach startling results because the Court adopts Judge
Bork's efficiency-predation dichotomy as the basis for the conduct
element.
III. THE SUPREME COURT ADOPTS THE EFFICIENCY-
PREDATION DICHOTOMY AS THE BASIS FOR THE CONDUCT
ELEMENT
The Supreme Court's contemporary position regarding the con-
duct element of the monopolization offense is set forth in two cases
discussed in this section."9 In these cases plaintiffs claimed that de-
fendants were monopolists and had engaged in conduct tending to
exclude the plaintiffs from the market. In each case the Court fo-
cused on the possibility that the alleged monopolist refused to deal or
cooperate with the plaintiff. Because of this focus, the Court needed
to address the conduct element in the context of refusals by monopo-
lists to cooperate with rivals. The Court concluded that the conduct
element was controlled by the efficiency-predation dichotomy and de-
veloped a qualified duty requiring monopolists sometimes to cooper-
ate with rivals.
In both of these cases, the Supreme Court failed to perceive that
the alleged monopolists engaged in conduct other than refusing to
cooperate with rivals and that the other conduct might give rise to
liability under the monopolization offense.
A. A Monopolist Ski Resort's Refusal to Cooperate with a Rival Is
Deemed Predatory Because It Was Not Efficient
1. The Supreme Court Condemns a Monopolist for Refusing
to Continue a Joint Marketing Arrangement With a Competitor
The Supreme Court addressed the conduct element of the mo-
nopolization offense in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp.40 In that case the defendant, Ski Co., owned three of four ski-
39. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1984); Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
40. Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. 585 (1984).
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ing facilities in Aspen, Colorado. The plaintiff, Highlands, owned
the fourth.4 In addition to offering skiing at each of their respective
facilities, the plaintiff and defendant had for a number of years coop-
erated to offer a joint four-mountain ticket. This ticket was good for
six consecutive days of skiing at any of the four mountains in
Aspen.42 The revenues from the joint four-mountain ticket were di-
vided between plaintiff and the defendant based upon the proportion
of skiing done by joint ticket holders at each mountain.4 In the late
1970's, discord developed between the plaintiff and the defendant
over the four-mountain ticket. This discord culminated in 1978 when
Ski Co. offered to continue the four-mountain ticket only if High-
lands would agree to accept a fixed share of the revenue which was
significantly below its historical average.44 Ski Co. purported to find
the distribution of revenues based on surveys of use unacceptable be-
cause it doubted the accuracy of the surveys and was troubled by the
methods employed by the survey takers.45 Therefore, Highlands of-
fered to pay for surveys by a nationally recognized accounting firm.
When Ski Co. refused to consider this proposal and stuck to its fixed
proportion offer, Highlands declined.46
The termination of the joint four-mountain ticket put High-
lands in a difficult marketing position. In place of the joint four-
mountain ticket, Ski Co. continued to offer a six-day ticket to its
three mountains. Highlands tried to create a convenient package
which would allow a skier to ski Highlands for several days and Ski
Co. for the remainder of the week. These efforts were thwarted by
Ski Co., which refused to sell daily lift tickets to Highlands at the
tour operator's discount or at retail.47 When Highlands marketed an
"Adventure Pack" consisting of a three-day Highlands pass and
41. Id. at 590.
42. Id.
43. The use of each mountain by joint ticket holders was monitored in three ways.
Initially the joint ticket took the form of a booklet of six coupons, each of which could be
exchanged at the ski lift for a day ticket. Under this system the portion of use by joint ticket
holders was monitored by counting the coupons collected at each mountain. Id. at 589. Later
the four-mountain ticket took the form of a pass worn around the neck. This allowed the
holder to avoid standing in the ticket line each morning. However, monitoring use of each
mountain by holders of the joint ticket became more difficult. During the first season in which
the around-the-neck pass was sold, usage was monitored by lift operators. Id. at 590. Thereaf-
ter random surveys were used to monitor use. Id.
44. Ski Co. offered Highlands 12.5% of the revenue from the joint ticket. Id. at 592.
"Highlands' share of the revenues from the ticket was 17.5% in 1973-1974, 18.5% in 1974-
1975, 16.8% in 1975-1976, and 13.2% in 1976-77." Id. at 590 (footnote omitted).
45. Id. at 592.
46. Id. at 593.
47. Id.
1993]
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three vouchers equal to the daily lift ticket price at Ski Co. and guar-
anteed by funds on deposit at an Aspen bank, Ski Co. refused to
accept the vouchers.48 After Highlands replaced the vouchers with
American Express Traveler's checks, Ski Co. established a price re-
lationship between its daily tickets and its six-day tickets, which
made the Adventure Pack an unprofitable package in Highlands'
view.49 Highlands' share of skiing in Aspen declined significantly af-
ter the abolition of the joint four-mountain ticket.5"
Highlands eventually filed suit alleging that Ski Co. had vio-
lated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by monopolizing the downhill
skiing market at Aspen. The trial court entered judgment on the
jury's verdict in favor of Highlands.5 1 Ski Co. did not challenge in
the Supreme Court the jury's special verdict finding that it possessed
monopoly power in the relevant market.52 Thus, the Court was faced
with the issue of whether Ski Co.'s actions satisfied the conduct ele-
ment of Section 2. The Court concluded in an eight to zero decision'
that while "even a firm with monopoly power has no general duty to
engage in a joint marketing program with a competitor,"54 Ski Co.'s
refusal to continue the joint four-mountain ticket satisfied the con-
duct element of the monopolization offense.55
2. The Supreme Court Fails to Perceive That Ski Co.'s
Conduct Was Analogous to a Tying Arrangement
The Court's sense that there was something unsavory about Ski
Co.'s conduct led it to condemnation of the demise of the four-moun-
tain ticket. The Court could have condemned Ski Co.'s conduct,
however, without focusing on the termination of the four-mountain
ticket or imposing a duty on monopolists to aid their competitors.
The Court failed to realize that Ski Co. engaged in conduct other
48. Id. at 593-94.
49. Id. at 594 n.15.
50. Id. at 594-95.
51. Id. at 595.
52. Id. at 596. The jury identified the relevant product market as downhill skiing at
destination ski resorts and relevant geographic submarket as Aspen. Id. at n.20. Treating
Aspen as a relevant submarket seems implausible on its face. Since most skiers travel long
distances to get to Aspen, the geographic market would seem considerably larger than Aspen.
By altering their travel arrangements slightly, skiers would end up at any of a large number of
resorts. Thus, even a firm with 100% of the skiing facilities at Aspen would have to compete
with many other resorts.
53. Justice White took no part in the decision. Id. at 585.
54. Id. at 600.
55. Id. at 610-11.
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than the termination of the four-mountain ticket which could be ana-
lyzed under the conduct element.
When Ski Co. terminated the four-mountain ticket, it continued
to offer a six-day ticket to its three mountains.56 This ticket was
offered at a substantial discount off the daily ticket price.57 The
Court observed that this price disparity created a strong incentive to
buy the six-day ticket. 8 The Court did not recognize, however, that
the pressure placed on skiers to buy the six-day ticket by Ski Co.'s
pricing policy could be analyzed separately from the termination of
the four-mountain ticket. The pricing structure adopted by Ski Co.
gave skiers staying a week three choices: They could ski for six days
at Ski Co. at a cheap rate; or, they could ski for six days at High-
lands; lastly they could ski at Highlands for several days and pay Ski
Co.'s expensive daily rate for the rest of their visit. For skiers af-
fected by the discount, the choice was skiing six days at Ski Co. or
six days at Highlands. The discount coerced skiers into a choice be-
tween purchasing solely from Ski Co. or solely from Highlands. The
Court did not recognize that the adoption of this pricing structure
was an act, separate from the termination of the joint four-mountain
ticket arrangement, which might satisfy the conduct element.
The coercive effect of Ski Co.'s pricing structure could be analo-
gized to a "tying" arrangement. Because Ski Co. was giving skiers a
substantial incentive to buy the six-day ticket instead of purchasing
individual tickets on a daily basis, it was in effect tying all six days
of skiing together.59 Ski Co.'s de facto tie of six days of skiing causes
two anticompetitive consequences. First, barriers to entry are signifi-
cantly raised and, second, Ski Co.'s power over price is enhanced.
Entry barriers are raised because entry will be required on a
much larger and more difficult scale. By tying six days of skiing to-
gether, Ski Co. altered the unit of production in the market. Before
the tie, the unit of production was one day of skiing. A producer in
the market had to offer a day of skiing of a competitive quality."°
After the tie, the unit of production for skiers who were spending a
week in Aspen was a six-day block of skiing. Once Ski Co. tied its
56. Id. at 593.
57. For example, during the 1981-82 season the six-day three-mountain ticket cost
S114, while six daily tickets cost $132. Id. at 594 n.15.
58. Id. at 610 n.42.
59. Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp recognize the coercive effect of Ski Co.'s pricing
practices and characterize the effect as "quasi-exclusive dealing." PHILUP AREEDA & HER-
BERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 736.1f (Supp. 1990).
60. A smaller unit of production is possible if producers sold tickets for portions of a day
and skiers wanted part-day tickets.
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skiing into a six-day package, such skiers could either ski six days at
Ski Co. or six days at Highlands.6" Under this arrangement, a pro-
ducer must offer not merely one day of skiing of competitive quality
but six.
Offering six days of quality skiing is substantially more difficult
than offering one. Many Aspen visitors want the variety in their
skiing experience that comes from skiing different types of terrain.6"
As a result, it takes a much larger facility to provide six days of
interesting skiing than one. Thus, if the unit of production is
changed from one day of skiing to six, a much larger scale of opera-
tion is required.
If an increase in scale merely required an increase in capital,
entry barriers might not be significantly affected. In the Aspen skiing
market, however, an increase in scale would be very difficult. To
begin, a world-class downhill skiing facility requires obvious topo-
graphical conditions. Most of the suitable terrain near Aspen is con-
trolled by the United States Forest Service, an agency heavily con-
cerned about the environmental impact of any new skiing facility.63
Further, approval of the county government would be required and
it had adopted a policy limiting growth.64 Because of these geo-
graphic and regulatory hurdles, it would be difficult for Highlands
to expand its existing facility significantly. Although it can offer one
day of interesting skiing, it cannot offer six. Therefore, when Ski
Co.'s tie increased its unit of production from one day to six days for
visitors staying a week, it effectively took Highlands out of that por-
tion of the market.
In addition to raising entry barriers, Ski Co.'s tie of six days of
skiing enhanced its power to control price. Most arrangements in-
volving tying and tied products that are used in fixed proportions do
not increase the seller's power to extract monopoly profits. 5 If the
seller has monopoly power in the tying product, it will often be able
61. The discussion in the text assumes that, because of the discount for the six-day
ticket, splitting the week between Ski Co. and Highlands and paying the higher daily rate was
unattractive at least for a significant number of skiers.
62. The utility of any one mountain declines over the time which a particular skier uses
it. During six days of skiing any mountain is of high quality only for several days. Aspen
Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 606 n.34.
63. Id. at 588.
64. Id. at 588-89.
65. If the tying and tied products are not used in fixed proportions, the seller may be
able to increase its profits by using sales of the tied product as a metering device to price
discriminate between high-volume and low-volume users. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at
229-30.
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to extract the total monopoly profits available by charging the mo-
nopoly price for that product."' In the Aspen skiing context, how-
ever, this typical analysis does not apply. This is because Ski Co. is
unable to determine which skiers are purchasing the product over
which Ski Co. has monopoly power.
In order to understand why this is so, it is necessary to recall
that because of skiers' demand for variety, the quality of skiing at
any one mountain declines after several days.6 7 Thus, during a par-
ticular skier's six-day stay in Aspen, Highlands can compete for sev-
eral of the days, but Ski Co. has the only available facilities for the
remainder. Because skiers do not ski the facilities in Aspen in any
particular order, absent the tie, Ski Co. will not be able to determine
when it is competing with Highlands and when it is not. Were it
able to do so, Ski Co. could extract the full monopoly profits by in-
creasing its price when it was not competing with Highlands. Since
it is not able to do this, the only way to capture these profits is to tie
the six days of skiing together and price them as a package. Thus,
tying the six days of skiing into a package allows Ski Co. to extract
monopoly profits not otherwise available by avoiding the impossible
task of determining when it is facing Highlands' competition and
when it is not.68
In summary, the Court recognized that Ski Co.'s pricing pattern
created a strong incentive for week-long visitors to Aspen to buy a
six-day Ski Co. ticket.6 9 The Court failed, however, to realize that
the adoption of this pricing pattern was an act separate from the
termination of the joint four-mountain ticket. Failure to recognize
this distinction prevented the Court from analyzing whether adopt-
ing this pricing pattern would have satisfied the conduct element of
the monopolization offense.
3. The Supreme Court Explains Its Condemnation of the
Demise of the Joint Marketing Arrangement by Adopting the
Efficiency-Predation Dichotomy
Because the Supreme Court did not recognize Ski Co.'s pricing
pattern as separate conduct, it focused on the termination of the joint
four-mountain ticket and condemned this termination as violating
66. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 223-24.
67. See supra text accompanying note 62.
68. For a similar analysis in the context of the block booking of movies, see PHILLIP
ARE.DA & Louis KAPI.OW, ANTHTRusr ANALYSIS-PROBL.EMS, TEXT, CASES 726 n.34 (4th
ed. 1988) and GEORGE STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 165-66 (1968).
69. Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 593-95.
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the conduct element. In reaching this conclusion, the Court quoted
Judge Bork and adopted the efficiency-predation dichotomy. "If a
firm has been 'attempting to exclude rivals on some basis other than
efficiency,' it is fair to characterize its behavior as predatory." '70 The
Court applied this standard by examining (1) the impact of Ski Co.'s
conduct on Highlands' ability to compete,71 (2) the effect of that con-
duct on consumer welfare,72 and (3) Ski Co.'s justification for its
conduct.73
The Court determined that termination of the joint four-moun-
tain ticket had a sufficiently adverse impact on Highlands' ability to
compete that it could properly be characterized as exclusionary. 74
Mere exclusion of a rival, however, is insufficient to satisfy the con-
duct element of the monopolization offense. Under the standard
adopted by the Court, this exclusion must be predatory rather than
efficient. 75 The Court found that consumer welfare declined when
the four-mountain ticket was abolished. It based this conclusion on
consumer surveys, anecdotal evidence, and the consumer preference
for the four-mountain ticket over a three-mountain Ski Co. ticket
when both were offered. The Court then considered Ski Co.'s justifi-
cation for its conduct. The Court assumed that the jury found that
Ski Co. had no valid business purpose for terminating the four-
mountain ticket 76 and determined that this finding was supported by
the evidence. 77 The Court concluded that the jury could have found
that no efficiency justification existed, and that Ski Co. sought finan-
cial gain, not by efficiency, but by excluding Highlands. 7
In the absence of an efficiency justification, the Court offered a
predatory explanation of Ski Co.'s conduct. It believed that Ski Co.
was foregoing profits by refusing to sell daily lift tickets to High-
lands for resale and by refusing to accept the vouchers contained in
70. Id. at 605 (footnote omitted)(quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARA-
Oox 138 (1978)).
71. Id. at 607.
72. Id. at 605.
73. Id. at 608.
74. Id. at 607-08.
75. Id. at 605.
76. Id. at 604-05.
77. Id. at 608-11. In rejecting Ski Co.'s efficiency justification the Court cited Judge
Bork's application of the efficiency-predation dichotomy to changes in distribution patterns. Id.
at 608-09 n. 39. See BORK, supra note 26, at 156-59.
78. Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 608-10. In determining that Ski Co. offered no effi-
ciency justification for its conduct, the Court rejected Ski Co.'s purported concerns about the
skier surveys to monitor use and being associated with Highlands' alleged inferior skiing.
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Highlands' Adventure Pack.79 The Court concluded that Ski Co.
may have been willing to forego these short-term profits in order to
gain long-term benefits by reducing Highlands' ability to compete in
the future."a Such a predatory strategy would satisfy the standard
adopted by the Court. The Court's inference, however, is hardly
compelled by the evidence. The Court assumed that when Ski Co.
refused to cooperate with Highlands' Adventure Pack program, ei-
ther by selling Ski Co. daily lift tickets in bulk to Highlands or by
accepting Adventure Pack vouchers, it was merely giving up ticket
sales. However, it seems much more likely that in trying to make the
Adventure Pack an inconvenient package for skiers to use, Ski Co.
was attempting to sell those skiers six days of skiing at Ski Co. facili-
ties. In essence, Ski Co. was telling skiers that it was more conven-
ient to ski at Ski Co.'s three mountains for six days than to ski part
of the week at Highlands and part of the week at Ski Co. Under this
view of the facts, Ski Co. was trying to sell more skiing up front. It
was not foregoing sales now in order to gain sales later after its com-
petitor was injured.81 Thus, the Court's predatory explanation is
inappropriate.
In summary, the Court in Aspen Skiing seems to be saying that
a monopolist violates Section 2 when it refuses to aid a competitor by
cooperating in a joint marketing effort, where the monopolist has
previously cooperated and cannot persuade a jury that its present
refusal is justified by an efficiency calculus.8 2 Such a conclusion
would, of course, have dramatic consequences in the on-going debate
about the parameters of the conduct element of the monopolization
offense.8"
79. "Ski Co. was apparently willing to forego daily ticket sales both to skiers who
sought to exchange the coupons contained in Highlands' Adventure Pack, and to those who
would have purchased Ski Co. daily lift tickets from Highlands if Highlands had been permit-
ted to purchase them in bulk." Id. at 608.
80. "The jury may well have concluded that Ski Co. elected to forego these short-run
benefits because it was more interested in reducing competition in the Aspen market over the
long run by harming its smaller competitor." Id. at 608.
81. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 59, at 753 n.36.
82. In reaching this conclusion the Court disclaimed reliance upon the essential facilities
doctrine. Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 611 n.44.
83. Aspen Skiing provoked considerable commentary. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook,
On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 972 (1986); Arthur H.
Travers, Jr., Does A Monopolist Have .4 Duty To Deal With Its Rivals?, Some Thoughts On
The Aspen Skiing Case, 57 U. Coi.o. L. REV. 727 (1986); Daniel W. Ladd, III, Note, The
Efficiency Defense: Section Two Limits On Monopolist Conduct After Aspen, 86 CoLUM. L.
RE.v. 1712 (1986); David M. Rievman, Note, The Grinnell Test of Monopolization Sounds A
False Alarm: Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 28 B.C. L. R:v. 415
(1987); Mary E. Schill, Note, Refusals To Deal By Single-Firm Monopolists-Should We
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The Court concludes that Ski Co.'s termination of the joint
four-mountain ticket was predatory because it was not efficient. This
analysis is based upon the efficiency-predation dichotomy, i.e., the
premise that profit maximizing conduct by a monopolist is either ef-
ficient or predatory. 4 The Supreme Court has recently relied on
Aspen Skiing to impose a duty on an alleged monopolist to sell to its
rivals.85
B. The Supreme Court Holds That a Machine Manufacturer
Must Sometimes Sell Parts to its Rivals in the Service Market
In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.86 the
Supreme Court faced claims under both Section 1 and Section 2 of
the Sherman Act. Section 1 prohibits agreements between two or
more parties which unreasonably restrain trade,87 while unilateral
conduct by a monopolist can violate Section 2. The defendant, Ko-
dak, engaged in three lines of business. It manufactured photocopy-
ing and micrographic equipment. It sold parts for the equipment it
manufactured. Finally, for a fee it serviced the equipment.88 The
plaintiffs were independent service organizations (hereinafter ISOs)
which competed with Kodak in providing service for equipment sold
by Kodak.89 Kodak manufactured some of the parts needed for ser-
vicing the equipment. Other parts were manufactured by third par-
ties called original-equipment manufacturers (hereinafter OEMs).9"
ISOs purchased parts either directly from Kodak and OEMs or indi-
rectly through intermediaries.91
The plaintiffs alleged that in the mid-1980's Kodak took steps
Rob Peter To Save Paul?, 63 NOTRE DAME L. R:v. 214 (1988); David M. Tyler, Jr., Note,
The Monopolist's Duty To Cooperate In Joint Marketing Ventures With Competitors: The
Quandary of Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 32 WAYNE L. REV. 1243
(1986); The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 99 HARv. L. REV. 120, 275-283 (1985).
84. Part IV will demonstrate that this premise is false. The efficiency-predation dichot-
omy fails because a monopolist may sometimes maximize its profits by conduct which is
neither efficient nor predatory.
85. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
86. Id.
87. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to
be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). The literal words of Section 1 appear to prohibit all agree-
ments restraining trade. For most of a century, however, courts have recognized that reasona-
ble restraints of trade are lawful. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231
(1918).
88. Eastman Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2076.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2077.
91. Id.
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to limit the availability of parts to ISOs to impede ISOs competing
in the service business.9 2 First, Kodak would not sell parts to ISOs.
Second, Kodak would sell parts to owners of Kodak equipment only
if they also purchased service from Kodak or did their own service.
Kodak would not sell parts to equipment owners who bought service
from ISOs. Third, Kodak agreed with OEMs that the OEMs would
sell parts which fit Kodak equipment only to Kodak.93 These steps
had the predictable adverse impact on the ISOs.
The ISOs sued alleging that the steps taken by Kodak violated
Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The plaintiffs alleged
that Kodak engaged in an unlawful tying arrangement tying the
purchase of parts to the purchase of service from Kodak. This ar-
rangement allegedly constituted an unreasonable agreement in re-
straint of trade which violated Section 1."'
Agreements which restrain trade are judged under two alterna-
tive standards. The standard applied to most agreements is the Rule
of Reason under which the procompetitive and anticompetitive as-
pects of the agreement are analyzed. 95 Some agreements, however,
are so likely to have anticompetitive consequences that they are
deemed illegal per se.9" Tying arrangements are per se illegal if four
elements are present.9 7 First, two separate products must exist. The
desired product is referred to as the tying product and the undesired
product is referred to as the tied product. Second, the sale of the
tying product must be conditioned on the sale of the tied product.
Third, the seller must have sufficient market power in the market for
the tying product to force the purchase of the tied product. Finally, a
not insubstantial volume of commerce in the tied product must be
affected.9 8 The principal element of the claim under Section 1 which
was in dispute before the Supreme Court was whether Kodak had
sufficient market power in parts to force the purchase of service.99
Kodak contended that it could not have market power over
parts since it did not have market power in the equipment market.
The district court had granted Kodak's motion for summary judg-
ment. Therefore, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether
92. Id. at 2077-78.
93. Id. at 2078.
94. Id. at 2074.
95. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-92 (1977).
96. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
97. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1983).
98. Id. at 12-18, 20-22.
99. Eastman Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2074.
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Kodak's contention was correct as a matter of law. If a reasonable
trier of fact could find that Kodak had market power in parts even
though it lacked power in equipment, then summary judgment was
not appropriate on this issue. The Supreme Court held that sum-
mary judgment was inappropriate.1"' It ruled that the ISOs had
presented sufficient evidence of power over parts and imperfect con-
nections between the parts and equipment markets to withstand a
motion for summary judgment.'
The ISOs also alleged that Kodak had violated Section 2 of the
Sherman Act by monopolizing or attempting to monopolize the parts
market and the service market.'0 2 The Supreme Court held that the
ISOs had presented sufficient evidence of monopoly power to survive
a motion for summary judgment on the power element of the mo-
nopolization offense.' 03 The Court went on to consider the evidence
that the conduct element of the monopolization offense was satisfied.
The Court's discussion of the conduct element begins with four
somewhat opaque sentences. First, the Court quotes United States v.
Griffith. ' 4 "The second element of a [section] 2 claim is the use of
monopoly power 'to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive ad-
vantage, or to destroy a competitor.' 05 This sentence seems to
stress the distinction between acts which are uses of monopoly power
and acts which do not depend on monopoly power.'0 6 The Court's
second sentence, however, does not address this distinction. "If Ko-
dak adopted its parts and service policies as part of a scheme of will-
ful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power, it will have vio-
lated [section] 2.'1107 This sentence stresses the willfulness of the
defendant's conduct. As has been frequently noted, however, willful-
ness is not a helpful concept for separating lawful from unlawful
100. Id. at 2089.
101. Id. at 2089-90.
102. Id. at 2089.
103. The ISOs had presented evidence that Kodak controlled almost 100% of the parts
market and over 80% of the market for service of Kodak equipment. 112 S. Ct. at 2089. The
monopoly power element of the monopolization offense of Section 2 requires more power than
the market power element of the per se tying offense under Section 1. Id.
104. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948).
105. Eastman Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2090.
106. See also Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 283 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980), in which the court distinguished conduct requiring
monopoly power from conduct which does not.
107. Eastman Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2090 (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384
U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966), United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d
Cir. 1945), and Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 600-05
(1984)).
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conduct by an alleged aggressor under the antitrust laws."08 The
paradigm of lawful conduct under the monopolization offense, the
non-predatory invention of a better or cheaper product, is a willful
act designed to make sales and gain market share. Thus, willfulness
does not separate lawful from unlawful conduct under Section 2.
The Court's third and fourth sentences addressing the conduct
element introduce the concept which the Court finds dispositive. "It
is true that as a general matter a firm can refuse to deal with its
competitors. But such a right is not absolute; it exists only if there
are legitimate competitive reasons for the refusal."10 9 The Court
cites Aspen Skiing' for this proposition."' The Court then goes on
to require business justifications for exclusionary acts in addition to
refusals to deal." 2 It is the presence or absence of "legitimate com-
petitive reasons" or "valid business reasons" which controls whether
a monopolist's exclusionary conduct is lawful. Since the case arrived
at the Court on an appeal from the grant of the defendant's motion
for summary judgment the issue was whether the plaintiffs presented
sufficient evidence contesting the defendant's offered business or com.-
petitive reasons to create a contested issue of fact.11 3
The Court concluded that summary judgment was improper
since contested issues of fact existed regarding the justifications
which Kodak offered for its conduct." 4 Kodak first asserted that
preventing equipment owners from using ISOs was justified because
it would maintain high standards for service. This would assist Ko-
dak in the equipment market by preventing customers from blaming
Kodak equipment for defects caused by poor service. The Court,
however, found that there was a contested issue of fact regarding
whether preventing equipment owners from using the ISOs they
preferred was necessary to ensure quality service and to ensure that
customers correctly assigned blame for defects. The ISOs had sub-
mitted evidence that they provided quality service. Furthermore, if
ISOs provided low quality service, the customers could reach that
108. See, e.g., A. A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396,
1400-02 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990).
109. Eastman Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2091.
110. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1984).
111. Eastman Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2091.
112. "As recounted at length above, respondents have presented evidence that Kodak
took exclusionary action to maintain its parts monopoly and used its control over parts to
strengthen its monopoly share of the Kodak service market. Liability turns, then, on whether
'valid business reasons' can explain Kodak's actions." Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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conclusion. The claim that customers were too unsophisticated to
make that determination was undermined by Kodak's willingness to
sell parts to customers who provided their own service and by Ko-
dak's claim in its market definition argument that customers were
extremely sophisticated at acquiring information."'
The Court also concluded that a factual issue existed regarding
the second justification offered by Kodak. Kodak claimed that
preventing customers from using ISOs was necessary to allow it to
control inventory costs. The Court concluded that inventory costs de-
pended on breakdown rates of Kodak equipment, not on who did the
service. Further, a concern with inventory costs would not explain
why Kodak prevented OEMs and others from selling parts to
ISOs. 1°
Finally, Kodak claimed that preventing customers from using
ISOs was justified in order to prevent free-riding on its efforts pro-
ducing the equipment.
Kodak claims that its policies prevent ISOs from 'exploit[ing]
the investment Kodak has made in product development, manu-
facturing and equipment sales in order to take away Kodak's
service revenues.' Brief for Petitioner 7-8. Kodak does not dis-
pute that respondents invest substantially in the service market,
with training of repair workers and investment in parts inven-
tory. Instead, according to Kodak, the ISOs are free-riding be-
cause they have failed to enter the equipment and parts
markets."'
The Court rejected this assertion as a matter of law. "This under-
standing of free-riding has no support in our caselaw." ' The Court
stated that conduct by a monopolist which requires a competitor to
enter two markets and thus increases entry barriers is unlawful." 9
Thus in the Court's view, Kodak's conduct, designed to force ISOs to
enter the parts market if they wanted to compete in the service mar-
ket, was not justifiable.
The Court's approach to the conduct element of the monopoli-
zation offense has two important features. First, the Court does not
set forth a definition of unlawful conduct. It refers to the concepts of
use of monopoly power and willfulness but does not apply those con-
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2091-92.
117. Id. at 2092.
118. Id.
119. "[Olne of the evils proscribed by the antitrust laws is the creation of entry barriers
to potential competitors by requiring them to enter two markets simultaneously." Id.
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cepts. Second, the Court relies heavily on Aspen Skiing in requiring
that a monopolist's conduct be justified by valid business or competi-
tive justifications. These justifications then separate lawful from un-
lawful conduct. Third, while the Court relied heavily on Aspen Ski-
ing, it does not overtly apply the concepts of predation and efficiency
which expressly underlie the test set forth in that case. Since the
Court offers no other conceptual basis for the conduct element and
relies on Aspen Skiing, it apparently continues to adhere to the con-
ceptual basis set forth there. Finally, the Court lumps all of the de-
fendant's conduct into one category. Kodak engaged in three differ-
ent types of conduct.120 It refused to sell parts to ISOs. It sold parts
to equipment owners only if they did not use ISOs. It agreed with
OEMs that they would not sell parts to ISOs. Each of these catego-
ries of conduct may be separately analyzed and subjected to the test
of lawful conduct under the monopolization offense of Section 2.
IV. THE FAILURE OF THE EFFICIENCY-PREDATION DICHOTOMY
Both Judge Bork and the Supreme Court accept the efficiency-
predation dichotomy as the basis for the conduct element of the mo-
nopolization offense. Under this view a monopolist acts in a preda-
tory manner when it engages in conduct which injures a rival and is
profit maximizing only because it will increase the firm's monopoly
profits in the future after the injured rival exits the market or limits
its competitive activities. 2 ' Thus, a predator foregoes profits in the
present in order to gain increased monopoly power, and profits, in
the future. 22 The efficiency-predation dichotomy consists of two
steps. The first is the truism that a profit maximizing monopolist is
either attempting to gain profits in the present or in the future. 2
120. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
121. BORK, supra note 26, at 144. For criticism of Bork's view from the perspective of
"raising rivals' costs" see Greer, supra note 32.
122. Some non-predatory conduct also requires foregoing profits in the present in order
to gain greater profits in the future. The construction of a new factory which will produce
goods at lower cost is an example. Constructing the factory costs money in the present. The
output of the factory will yield profits in the future. Building the factory would not be preda-
tory, however, if the future profits did not depend on any increase or stabilization of the firm's
monopoly power, i.e., the power over price. Building a new, lower cost factory could be profit
maximizing for a small firm in a competitive market with no monopoly power. Such an act
would not be predatory. A monopolist may build a similar factory for similar reasons and such
conduct would not be predatory. Predatory conduct requires an effect on monopoly power.
Non-predatory conduct is profit maximizing without an effect on monopoly power, i.e., the
power over price.
123. In Aspen Skiing the Court asked whether the defendant's conduct yielded increased
revenue in the present or would increase profits only in the future. Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S.
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The second step is the assertion that a monopolist may gain profits
in the present without any increase in its monopoly power only by
being more efficient than its rivals.' 2" If this second step were true
then the universe of profit maximizing conduct by a monopolist
could be divided into hemispheres of the efficient and the preda-
tory.' 25 The assertion that a monopolist may gain profits in the pre-
sent only by being more efficient than its rivals is, however, false. A
monopolist may engage in conduct which is presently profit maxi-
mizing without any effect on the actor's monopoly power but which
reduces the net welfare of society. Such conduct is neither predatory
nor efficient. It is not predatory because it presently maximizes prof-
its without any effect on monopoly power. It is not efficient because
it reduces the net welfare of society. Thus, the efficiency-predation
dichotomy fails and cannot be used as the basis for the conduct ele-
ment of the monopolization offense. This Part IV will examine two
scenarios where profit maximizing conduct by a monopolist is
neither predatory nor efficient and will explain why Aspen Skiing
and Eastman Kodak are examples of both such scenarios.
A. Forcing Customers into an All or Nothing Choice
The efficiency-predation dichotomy assumes that a monopolist
maximizes profits either by foregoing revenue now in order to gain
more monopoly profits later, i.e. predation, or by gaining revenue
now by advancing efficiency. The dichotomy breaks down if a mo-
nopolist can gain monopoly profits now without advancing efficiency.
Such conduct would be neither predatory nor efficient. This is so
when third parties such as customers or suppliers would prefer to
deal both with a firm possessing monopoly power and with a com-
petitor, but the monopolist engages in conduct designed to force cus-
tomers or suppliers into dealing only with it. In such a situation the
monopolist may presently gain revenues without advancing
efficiency.
An example of confusion over the existence of this possibility is
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States.'26 In that case the defendant
newspaper served ninety-nine percent of the families in Lorain,
at 608-1I.
124. If the monopolist's conduct is presently profit-maximizing without an impact on
monopoly power, that conduct is by definition not predatory. BORK, supra note 26, at 144.
The efficiency-predation insists that if conduct is not predatory, it is efficient. Id. at 138-39.
125. Id. at 138-39.
126. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
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Ohio, a city of 52,000.12' When a radio station commenced opera-
tions eight miles away in Elyria, the defendant newspaper refused to
accept any advertising from businesses which also advertised on the
new radio station. The United States filed a civil action alleging that
the defendant newspaper violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by
engaging in an attempt to monopolize. 2 The Supreme Court agreed
with the government and upheld the district court's judgment in its
favor.129
The newspaper's conduct obviously caused advertisers to make
a difficult choice. Many businesses wanted to advertise both in the
newspaper and on the new radio station, but if forced to choose be-
tween using only the newspaper or only the radio, would choose the
newspaper. °30 When the defendant newspaper forced the advertisers
into making this choice it did not advance efficiency. Instead, it re-
duced the net welfare of society. The advertisers were worse off. By
their own calculus, the advertisers maximized their welfare with a
mix of newspaper and radio advertising. The defendant's conduct,
which denied advertisers this choice, reduced their welfare. The
newspaper, of course, gained by this strategy. It gained either by
selling more advertising now or by forcing the radio station from the
market and selling more advertising and/or charging higher rates
later. 1 3 1 If it sought to gain by selling more advertising now, the
newspaper's welfare gains would be directly offset by welfare losses
to the radio station. These losses, combined with losses to advertisers,
would yield a net loss to society. If the newspaper sought to gain by
driving the radio station from the market and thereafter selling more
and/or higher priced advertising later, the newspaper's welfare gains
would be more than offset by current and future welfare losses to the
radio station and advertisers. Thus, the newspaper's conduct forcing
advertisers into an unpleasant choice does not advance efficiency.
A question which has caused more confusion is whether the
newspaper's conduct was predatory in the sense which Judge Bork
and the Supreme Court use the term. The newspaper's conduct
would be predatory in that sense if it were profit maximizing only
because it caused the radio station to exit the market or otherwise
127. Id. at 146.
128. Id. at 145.
129. Id. at 144.
130. "Numerous Lorain advertisers wished to supplement their local newspaper adver-
tising with local radio advertising but could not afford to discontinue their newspaper advertis-
ing in order to use the radio." Id. at 153.
131. See infra text accompanying notes 132-33.
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refrain from competitive behavior and thereafter allowed the news-
paper to charge increased monopoly profits sufficient to recoup pre-
sent costs of the challenged conduct.132 This is predation in the sense
of giving up profits now in order to gain monopoly profits later. The
problem with reaching such a conclusion here is that it is far from
clear that the newspaper's conduct caused it to forego present profits.
Assuming that the Court was correct in its conclusion that newspa-
per advertising was essential to a large number of advertisers, the
defendant newspaper would probably gain rather than lose present
profits by forcing these advertisers to choose between advertising only
on the radio or only in the newspaper. The newspaper's strategy
might cause it to lose some present revenue because some advertisers
might choose advertising only on the radio as opposed to only in the
newspaper. Further advertisers who choose to advertise only in the
newspaper might be willing to pay less per unit of advertising com-
pared to what they would be willing to pay without the restriction
limiting their advertising to the newspaper.13 However, the newspa-
per's strategy would cause it to gain present revenue because it
would sell more units of advertising. Given the Court's assumption
that newspaper advertising was essential for many advertisers, pre-
sumably the vast majority of advertisers would choose advertising
only in the newspaper over advertising only on the radio. These ad-
vertisers would have preferred to reach consumers in part by news-
paper and in part by radio. Because the defendant newspaper has
denied them this option these advertisers are forced to use the news-
paper for all of their advertising messages. While the radio was the
preferred route for some of these advertisements, when that route is
closed, presumably they will turn to the newspaper as the only avail-
able medium for at least some of the advertising dollars for which
the radio station would have been used.
In any particular case a factual question arises whether a de-
fendant presently gains profits by forcing its customers to choose be-
tween buying all or none of their requirements from it. In at least
some cases, however, the defendant will gain profits from increased
unit sales. In such cases the increased profits result from increased
unit sales, not an increase in monopoly power, i.e. the power over
price. It seems likely that the defendant newspaper's strategy in Lo-
rain Journal is such a case. The existence of such cases demon-
strates the flawed nature of the efficiency-predation dichotomy. In
132. See supra text accompanying note 31.
133. This is suggested by AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 68, 357.
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such a case the defendant's behavior is neither predatory nor effi-
cient. It is not predatory because the defendant's conduct is presently
profit maximizing due to increased unit sales without requiring that
the victim exit the market and leave the defendant with the ability to
raise the unit price to monopoly levels. The defendant's conduct is
not efficient because it reduces the net welfare of society. The mo-
nopolist is better off but both the rival and the customers are worse
off. Thus, the existence of this scenario demonstrates the failure of
the efficiency-predation dichotomy.
B. Refusing to Share Access to Resources
The preceding section examined the possibility that a monopo-
list could harm a competitor by forcing third parties who preferred
to deal with the monopolist and with rivals into an all or nothing
choice. In some cases such conduct by a monopolist would be neither
predatory nor efficient. A monopolist may also harm rivals, while
being neither predatory nor efficient, by refusing to share access to
certain resources. The existence of such conduct further demonstrates
the failure of the efficiency-predation dichotomy advocated by Judge
Bork and adopted by the Supreme Court.
Some resources can be created more cheaply by one firm than
by two."" A monopolist with access to such a resource who denies
access to a competitor may be acting in a manner which is neither
predatory nor efficient. If the denial maximizes present profits by
increasing sales of the monopolist's end product it is not predatory.
Conduct is predatory if it foregoes present profits and is profit maxi-
mizing only because it will drive the competitor from the market, or
otherwise chasten competitive behavior, leaving the monopolist with
increased monopoly power and the opportunity to recoup foregone
profits in the future.1"5 A refusal to share access to a resource which
can be produced most cheaply by one firm may not be efficient. The
refusal may reduce the net welfare of society by causing the competi-
tor to recreate the resource or to use some inferior substitute. Such a
denial of access by a monopolist would be neither predatory nor
efficient.
An example of this possibility is contained in International
134. The statement in the text is sometimes used as a definition of a "natural monop-
oly." See John Cirace, An Economic Analysis of Antitrust Law's Natural Monopoly Cases, 88
W. VA. L. REV. 677, 687 (1986) (examining natural monopoly cases from an efficiency
perspective).
135. See supra text accompanying note 32.
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Boxing Club, Inc. v. United States."6 In that case defendants were
charged with violating Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by
monopolizing and conspiring to restrain and monopolize the promo-
tion of championship boxing matches. 3 As part of their boxing em-
pire, the defendants controlled, by ownership interests, both the Chi-
cago Stadium and Madison Square Garden in New York City.1 38
The Supreme Court upheld far-reaching injunctive relief against the
defendants which included a provision mandating access by competi-
tors to the Chicago Stadium and Madison Square Garden. The de-
cree required defendants to lease these facilities on reasonable terms
to competitors promoting championship bouts.1 9 If the parties could
not agree on terms, the court would set them.
A major stadium or arena is a resource which can be created
more cheaply by one firm so long as the capacity of the facility has
not been exhausted. In denying access to competitors, the defendants
had not necessarily been acting in a predatory fashion. The denial
may have been presently profit maximizing by making the defend-
ant's bouts more attractive than those of competitors. This increase
in the value of the defendant's product may have offset any foregone
leasing revenue. The denial would have been predatory only if it
caused a present reduction in revenue to be offset by a future in-
crease in monopoly power and profits. The defendant's denial of ac-
cess to competitors was presumably not efficient. A resource went
unused when its capacity had not been reached. Competitors were
forced to switch to some inferior substitute. Thus, the defendant's
conduct may have been neither predatory nor efficient.
Another example of a refusal by a monopolist to share access to
a resource with a rival which is neither predatory nor efficient is
contained in Olympia Equipment Leasing Co. v. Western Union
Telegraph Co. 4" In that case the court, in an opinion by Judge Pos-
ner, reversed a judgment that the defendant had engaged in illegal
monopolization because the court concluded that the conduct element
of the monopolization offense had not been satisfied. " For many
years Western Union required subscribers to its telex service to lease
136. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242
(1958).
137. Id. at 244.
138. Id. at 248.
139. Id. at 261.
140. Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370 (7th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 934 (1987).
141. Id. at 376.
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the terminal necessary to use the service from Western Union. West-
ern Union purchased these terminals from the Teletype Corporation.
In the early 1970's Western Union unbundled this package and al-
lowed customers to obtain the terminal from other suppliers.1 4 Fur-
ther, it attempted to sell the terminals then leased to the lessees."'
The plaintiff, Olympia, was formed to lease telex terminals, which it
too purchased from the Teletype Corporation, to telex subscribers." 4
When Western Union unbundled the telex transmission service
and terminal, it overtly encouraged third parties, like Olympia, to
enter the terminal market. As part of this encouragement, it "told
prospective vendors of such equipment that it would put them on a
list which its salesmen would give new subscribers to telex service
who were seeking terminals." '45 Olympia had no sales force of its
own when it entered the terminal leasing business and relied solely
on referrals obtained by its presence on the list distributed by West-
ern Union sales personnel. Olympia was quite successful in this ef-
fort, installing twenty percent (20%) of all telex terminals installed
for a time. When Western Union discovered that it was not selling
its existing inventory of telex terminals quickly enough, it ceased dis-
tributing the referral list of terminal vendors to customers. This pre-
dictably had a devastating impact on Olympia, causing it to cease
operations. 46
Olympia sued Western Union alleging that Western Union had
violated the monopolization offense of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
The jury agreed with Olympia and the trial court entered a judg-
ment for $36 million. Judge Posner's opinion sustained the trial
court's conclusion that Western Union had monopoly power in telex
transmission service. Judge Posner also agreed that a monopolist
such as Western Union, whose prices are regulated in the monopo-
lized market, may violate Section 2 by impairing competition in a
related market. Judge Posner, however, did not agree that Western
Union had inappropriately restrained competition in the terminal
market by ceasing to deliver its referral list of terminal suppliers to
customers. He rejected Olympia's arguments that Aspen Skiing re-
quired Western Union to continue this assistance to Olympia and
other vendors.1,47
142. Id. at 372.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 373.
147. Id. at 379.
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When Western Union ceased the distribution of its referral list
of terminal vendors, it was engaging in conduct which was neither
predatory nor efficient. This conduct was not predatory because it
was intended to presently maximize profits by increasing sales. The
profit maximizing nature of this conduct was not dependent upon
causing rivals to exit the market leaving Western Union with the
power to recoup profits later. Indeed in the long run Western Union
was getting out of the terminal leasing business. Western Union's
conduct was not predatory. It was designed to make more money
now by increasing unit sales, not by increasing monopoly power.
Western Union's decision to cease delivering the referral list of
terminal vendors also was not efficient. Western Union decided not
to share its sales force with Olympia and other terminal vendors.
This decision was rational and profit maximizing from Western
Union's perspective. This decision, however, caused the total cost of
distributing telex terminals to increase. Now firms such as Olympia
would have to hire their own sales force to survive.1" 8 Since Olympia
and Western Union were both offering terminals manufactured by
Teletype Corporation there were not complex differences in availa-
ble equipment to explain. The referral list was a very efficient means
of telling customers of the existence of other vendors of the same
product. While it was understandable that Western Union was not
interested in financing this efficient means by sharing access to its
sales force, the termination of the referral list, although not preda-
tory, was not efficient. Thus, although Judge Posner's conclusion
about the legality of Western Union's conduct may be correct, it can-
not be explained on the basis of the efficiency-predation dichotomy
advocated by Judge Bork and adopted by the Supreme Court. The
existence of situations in which a monopolist's denial of access to a
resource is neither predatory nor efficient demonstrates the failure of
the efficiency-predation dichotomy.
C. Aspen Skiing as an Example of Both Forcing Customers into
an Inefficient All or Nothing Choice and Refusing to Efficiently
Share Access to Resources
In Aspen Skiing the Court failed to realize that the defendant
was engaged in two different acts, both of which could be neither
predatory nor efficient. Ski Co. adopted prices for its daily tickets
and six-day tickets for its three mountains which created a powerful
148. Id.
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incentive to purchase the six-day ticket.149 Ski Co. also refused to
continue the joint four-mountain ticket with Highlands.1 50 While the
Court recognized the coercive effects of.Ski Co.'s pricing structure, it
did not realize that adopting that structure was an act separate from
terminating the joint four-mountain ticket with Highlands. This fail-
ure caused the Court to focus on the termination of the joint four-
mountain ticket to which it then applied the efficiency-predation di-
chotomy. The Court's conclusion that the termination of the joint
four-mountain ticket was predatory1 51 is tainted by its failure to re-
alize that conduct may be neither predatory nor efficient. In fact, it is
extremely likely that both the adoption of a coercive price structure
and the termination of the joint four-mountain ticket were neither
predatory nor efficient.
When Ski Co. adopted a price structure that significantly dis-
counted its six-day three-mountain ticket from the price of six daily
tickets it created a powerful incentive to buy the six-day ticket. This
coercive pricing policy is an example of conduct which forces con-
sumers who would like to purchase some of their requirements from
the monopolist and some from a rival into an all or nothing
choice.'5 2 Some skiers who would have preferred to ski several days
at Highlands and several days on Ski Co.'s mountains will be co-
erced by Ski Co.'s price structure into foregoing skiing at Highlands.
While there is no reason to believe that this conduct is predatory,
there is also no reason to believe that it is efficient.
In adopting this pricing structure, Ski Co. was probably trying
to maximize profits now by selling more skiing. Like the advertisers
in Lorain Journal,5 ' if skiers were given a choice between buying
all or nothing from the monopolist, more would choose all than
nothing. Here Ski Co. offered skiers a somewhat more subtle choice
to the same effect. Ski Co.'s pricing structure forced skiers into
choosing between buying all of their skiing at Ski Co. for a cheap
rate or some from Ski Co. at an expensive rate and some from High-
lands. The result of this strategy was that Ski Co. sold more ski-
ing. 54 If Ski Co. was attempting to maximize profits now by selling
more skiing, then its strategy was not predatory since it did not de-
149. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
152. See supra Part IV.A.
153. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951). For a discussion of the
Lorain Journal circumstances, see supra text accompanying notes 126-33.
154. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 594-95 (1984).
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pend on an increase in Ski Co.'s power over price. The profit maxi-
mizing nature of the strategy in such a situation would not depend
on forcing Highlands from the market to enhance Ski Co.'s monop-
oly power and thereafter recoup foregone profits.
While Ski Co.'s pricing structure may not have been predatory,
neither was it efficient. As in Lorain Journal, the mere fact that the
monopolist maximizes its current profits by forcing customers into an
unpleasant choice does not measure the impact of the strategy on
society as a whole. This is the ultimate fallacy of the efficiency-pre-
dation dichotomy. Any business gained by Ski Co. was lost to High-
lands, creating a wash. Any money saved by skiers in the form of a
discounted six day ticket was lost to Ski Co., creating another wash.
The welfare effect of the discounted six-day ticket is that skiers who
would have preferred the variety of skiing several days at Highlands
and several days at Ski Co. end up foregoing the variety of four
mountains. This caused a net reduction in the welfare of society.
Thus while Ski Co.'s pricing strategy may not have been predatory
because it resulted in Ski Co. selling more skiing, it was not efficient.
Like Ski Co.'s pricing strategy, the termination of the four-
mountain ticket was neither predatory nor efficient. The termination
of the joint four-mountain ticket should be analyzed as an act sepa-
rate from the discounted nature of Ski Co.'s three-mountain ticket.
Ski Co. might have terminated the joint four-mountain ticket but
offered an undiscounted three-mountain ticket. Such conduct would
constitute a refusal to share resources which is neither predatory nor
efficient.
Visitors to Aspen desire variety in their skiing.' 55 Ski Co. had
acquired three mountains which offered skiers substantial variety.
Ski Co. previously shared access to these three mountains with
Highlands by offering the joint four-mountain ticket. Ski Co.'s deci-
sion to terminate the four-mountain ticket was a decision to refuse to
continue to share access to its resources. Analyzed separately from its
subsequent pricing strategy, this refusal to share access to its three
mountains was neither predatory nor efficient.
There is no reason to believe that Ski Co. was engaged in a
predatory strategy in terminating the four-mountain ticket. This ter-
mination, like its subsequent pricing strategy, 156 was probably
designed to sell more skiing now rather than to forego profits now in
the hope of recouping more monopoly profits later. Even without
155. Id. at 606 n.34.
156. See supra text accompanying note 154.
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discounting its six-day three-mountain ticket, Ski Co. may have sold
more skiing by terminating the joint four-mountain ticket. When ski-
ers could purchase the joint four-mountain ticket, Ski Co. obtained
no advantage from the fact that three mountains were owned by a
single firm. A skier holding a joint four-mountain ticket could freely
move from one mountain to another. Each mountain stood alone in
offering quality skiing. The desired variety flowed from the joint of-
fering of mountains owned by different firms, not from a single firm
owning more than one mountain. When the joint four-mountain
ticket was terminated, Ski Co. was able to capture some value from
its ownership of three mountains.
Ski Co. offered a six-day ticket to its three mountains. If that
six-day ticket was not discounted off the price of six daily tickets,
skiers could still ski Ski Co. and Highlands by purchasing daily lift
tickets at each resort. However, even an undiscounted six-day ticket
offered the convenience of purchasing only a single ticket. Thus, Ski
Co. could offer convenience and variety to skiers purchasing its six-
day ticket. Ski Co.'s termination of the joint ticket with Highlands
would be predatory only if Ski Co. immediately made less money
because of the termination. It seems much more likely that Ski Co.
would sell more skiing rather than less because after the termination
only Ski Co. offered the convenience of purchasing a single ticket
during a six-day visit and the variety of skiing three mountains. In
such a situation Ski Co.'s increased profits would result from in-
creased unit sales rather than increased power over price.
Although Ski Co.'s termination of the six-day four-mountain
ticket was probably not predatory, it also was not efficient. 57 The
Court correctly concluded that the welfare of skiers declined after the
termination of the joint four-mountain ticket.1 58 Before the termina-
tion skiers could conveniently ski four mountains. After the termina-
tion skiers had convenient access to only three mountains. 59 Since
any business gained by Ski. Co. was lost to Highlands, the reduction
in the welfare of skiers caused a net reduction in the welfare of soci-
ety. Thus, the termination of the four-mountain ticket constituted a
refusal to share access to resources which was neither predatory nor
157. See also Cirace, supra note 134, at 720-28, in which the author analyzes the effi-
ciency aspect of Ski Co.'s conduct as a balance of the efficiency enhancing effect of shared
access and the potential detriments of joint price setting.
158. Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 605-07. See also Lawrence A. Sullivan, Section 2 of
the Sherman Act and Vertical Strategies, 21 Sw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1239 n.67 (1992).
159. Ski Co.'s pricing strategy enhanced the reduction in consumers' welfare. See supra
text accompanying notes 154-55.
19931
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
efficient.
In summary, Aspen Skiing presents examples of both conduct
which forces consumers into an inefficient choice and a refusal to
efficiently share access to resources. Both of these acts may be neither
predatory nor efficient. Acts are neither predatory nor efficient if
they presently maximize the profits of a monopolist by increasing its
sales rather than by increasing its power but cause the net welfare of
society to decrease. The fact that conduct is neither predatory nor
efficient destroys the efficiency-predation dichotomy advocated by
Judge Bork and adopted by the Supreme Court as a test for deter-
mining the legality of conduct by a monopolist.
D. Eastman Kodak as an Example of Both Forcing Customers
and Suppliers into an Inefficient All or Nothing Choice and
Refusing to Efficiently Share Access to Resources
In Eastman Kodak"'0 the Supreme Court lumped all of Ko-
dak's conduct into one category for purposes of the conduct element
of Section 2. Kodak, however, engaged in three different categories of
conduct, each of which might be subject to different treatment under
the monopolization offense."' First, Kodak refused to sell parts to
ISOs. Second, Kodak agreed with other manufacturers of parts for
Kodak equipment (OEMs) that they would not sell parts to ISOs.
Finally, Kodak refused to sell parts to equipment owners who
bought repair service from ISOs. The efficiency-predation dichotomy
assumes that each of these acts must be either efficient or predatory.
The third possibility, however, is that these acts were neither.
Kodak's refusal to sell parts to ISOs could be efficient, preda-
tory or neither. This refusal to deal would be efficient if it enhanced
the net welfare of society. The typical decision by a seller to sell to
the highest bidder results in an efficient refusal to sell to bidders
offering less. Such a decision transfers the good to the person who
values it most highly, i.e. the person willing to pay the most.162
Given a choice between transferring the good to someone who values
it more and someone who values it less, the efficient choice is to
transfer it to the person who values it more and refuse to sell to the
person who values it less. There is, however, no indication that ISOs
valued the parts less than the customers to which Kodak was willing
160. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
162. The statement in the text is, of course, subject to the usual assumption that the
marginal value of money is equal.
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to sell, i.e. equipment owners who also bought service from Kodak or
who performed their own service. The fact that Kodak was willing
to sell parts to equipment owners performing self service demon-
strates that Kodak valued the price more than the part 6 ' and that
the equipment owners valued the part more than the price. The
transfer increased the net welfare of society since the welfare of both
Kodak and the equipment owner increased.' 64 The ISOs were will-
ing to pay Kodak the same prices for parts that were paid by the self
servicing equipment owners, a price which, other things being equal,
Kodak valued more than the parts. Yet Kodak was unwilling to sell
parts to ISOs. If the transfer of parts to self servicing equipment
owners was efficient, then a transfer of the same parts at the same
prices to ISOs would be similarly efficient. Kodak refused to engage
in this efficient transfer for some reason which maximized its profits.
The remaining question is whether that profit maximizing reason
was predatory or not.
Kodak's refusal to sell parts to ISOs would be predatory if it
maximized Kodak's profits only by increasing Kodak's monopoly
profits in the future. An act is predatory if it presently costs money
but will yield profits in the future after the actor's monopoly power
is increased. Such an increase in monopoly power could result from
competitors being forced from the market or scared into ceasing com-
petitive behavior.' 65 Predatory conduct is a present investment of
money hoping for a future return once monopoly power has in-
creased or been made more secure. Kodak's refusal to sell parts to
ISOs would be predatory if it presently cost Kodak money but would
increase Kodak's monopoly profits in the future. The refusal does
cause Kodak to lose the revenue from the sale of parts and does in-
jure the ISOs. Indeed, it caused some ISOs to leave the market and
resulted in increased service business for Kodak. This, however, does
not demonstrate that the refusal to sell parts was predatory. The
refusal might have been presently profit maximizing without regard
to any increase in Kodak's monopoly power.
The refusal to sell parts to ISOs resulted in increased service
sales by Kodak. Its parts sales remained the same' 66 and its service
163. It is theoretically possible that Kodak valued the part more than the price but was
willing to sell parts to self servicing customers in order to sell equipment in the first place.
164. Otherwise one or both of the parties would have refused to engage in the
transaction.
165. See supra text accompanying note 32.
166. The statement in the text assumes that breakdown rates for Kodak equipment re-
mained constant and that no new parts suppliers entered the market. In such a case, the parts
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sales increased. If service was a profitable business, Kodak's profits
increased in.the present because of its refusal to sell parts to ISOs.
The refusal to sell parts to ISOs, therefore, did not cause Kodak to
forego profit in the present. It is also important to note that this
increase in profits did not require any increase in Kodak's monopoly
power or any decrease in the competitive strength of the ISOs. The
increase in Kodak's profits resulted from the increase in unit sales of
service. It did not depend on Kodak increasing its monopoly power,
i.e. its ability to raise price above cost. The refusal to sell parts to
ISOs would have been profit maximizing if it increased combined
profits from parts and service sales even if Kodak's monopoly power
remained the same.16 The fact that Kodak's monopoly power may
have increased does not demonstrate that its conduct was predatory.
If the conduct would have maximized profits even if monopoly
power remained constant, then the conduct was not predatory. Con-
duct is predatory only if its profit maximizing nature is dependent
on the conduct's effect on monopoly power.
In summary, Kodak's refusal to sell parts to ISOs may have
been neither predatory nor efficient. It was not predatory if its profit
maximizing nature was not dependant on its impact on Kodak's mo-
nopoly power. It was not efficient if it reduced the net welfare of
society. In such a case the refusal would constitute another example
of an inefficient but non-predatory refusal to share access to a re-
source, i.e. the parts, which can be most cheaply produced by a sin-
gle firm."6 8 The parts which Kodak produced could be manufactured
by the ISOs only at greater cost than Kodak could produce and sell
them. 69 Thus, although the refusal to sell parts to ISOs was pres-
ently profit maximizing for Kodak, it was not efficient.
The second category of conduct which Kodak undertook in-
volved other manufacturers of parts for Kodak equipment (OEMs).
Kodak and the OEMs agreed that the OEMs would not sell parts
which fit Kodak equipment to ISOs. Like Kodak's own refusal to
sell parts to ISOs, this agreement between Kodak and the OEMs
could be neither efficient nor predatory. 70 Kodak was obviously try-
which Kodak did not sell to ISOs it did sell to equipment owners who either used Kodak
service or did self service.
167. Monopoly power could remain constant even though market share was somewhat
increased.
168. See supra part IV.B.
169. If the ISOs could have produced the parts as cheaply as Kodak, they would have
done so when Kodak refused to sell rather than suffer the losses they did.
170. In addition to liability under Section 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp.II 1990), the agree-
ment between Kodak and the OEMs must be scrutinized under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
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ing to maximize its welfare by preventing the OEMs from selling to
the ISOs. The first question was whether this strategy was predatory
or not. The strategy would be predatory if it reduced Kodak's profits
in the present but would increase its monopoly profits in the future
sufficiently to recoup the presently foregone profits. The strategy
would not be predatory if it was presently profit maximizing without
regard to any impact on Kodak's monopoly power. As with Kodak's
own refusal to sell parts to the ISOs, it seems likely that Kodak's
agreement with the OEMs would be profit maximizing without re-
gard to any increase in its monopoly power. Kodak was trying to sell
more service to equipment owners. By making it more difficult for
ISOs to obtain parts Kodak's service business would increase. Fur-
ther, it would also sell more parts.' Thus, the agreement eliminat-
ing parts sales to ISOs by OEMs would increase Kodak's parts and
service profits in the present without regard to any impact on its
monopoly power, i.e. the power to increase price above cost. The
increase in Kodak's welfare would result from increased unit sales of
service and parts. It would not depend on increasing Kodak's power
over price. In such a case, the agreement would not be predatory.
The remaining question is whether the agreement was efficient.
The agreement would be efficient only if it increased the net welfare
of society. Before Kodak came to the OEMs with the proposed
agreement, the OEMs had three choices. They could sell solely to
Kodak, sell solely to others, or sell both to Kodak and others. The
OEMs chose to sell both to Kodak and others. The OEMs chose this
alternative since, of the three choices, it maximized their welfare.
Kodak then reduced the choices available to the OEMs from three to
two. The OEMs lost the welfare maximizing choice of selling both
to Kodak and others. The OEMs could now sell solely to Kodak or
solely to others. Given this limited choice, the OEMs chose to sell
solely to Kodak. While this was the welfare maximizing choice of
the two remaining, it was not as beneficial to the OEMs as the alter-
Id. § 1. That section prohibits unreasonable contracts and combinations in restraint of trade.
Id. § 1. Although Kodak's own refusal to sell parts to ISOs was a unilateral act and therefore
not subject to Section 1, the agreement between Kodak and the OEMs was concerted behavior
subject to assessment under Section 1.
171. Kodak's own refusal to sell parts to ISOs would leave its parts sales constant since
the equipment owners would need the same number of Kodak-made parts. The only question
is whether Kodak would sell the part directly to the equipment owner or indirectly through
the ISOs. See supra note 166. The agreement with the OEMs, however, would increase Ko-
dak's parts sales since it would now be reselling parts to equipment owners which it purchased
from OEMs. If this resale of parts was a profitable business, Kodak's parts profits would
increase.
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native they previously selected, i.e. selling both to Kodak and to
others. Thus, the welfare of the OEMs declined.1 72
The ISOs were also worse off after the OEMs were coerced
into refusing to sell parts to them. Prior to this refusal the ISOs
could provide service without also manufacturing parts. After this
refusal the ISOs had to manufacture parts, induce new OEMs to
enter the market or exit the service business. The refusal of the
OEMs to sell parts to the ISOs thus reduced the welfare of both the
OEMs and the ISOs.
The agreement between Kodak and the OEMs would be ineffi-
cient unless the diminished welfare of both the ISOs and the OEMs
was offset by welfare gains for Kodak.1 7' Kodak gained by coercing
OEMs into refusing to sell parts to ISOs. There is no reason, how-
ever, to believe that Kodak's welfare gains were sufficient to offset
the welfare losses of the other parties. In making its decision to force
the OEMs into choosing between selling solely to it or solely to
others, Kodak was not assessing the impact on the net welfare of
society. Instead, Kodak was assessing only the impact on its own
profits. Kodak's welfare went up since it was now selling more parts
and service.174 This welfare gain for Kodak was offset by welfare
losses to the ISOs who lost these very same sales of parts and service.
The welfare loss for the OEMs was not offset by welfare gains for
any one.175 Further, since the welfare gains for Kodak depended on
impeding sales of service by ISOs to equipment owners, the welfare
loss by equipment owners is also important. This welfare loss was
not offset by any welfare gain.1 7' Therefore, the agreement prevent-
ing sales of parts by OEMs to ISOs would not be efficient if it re-
duced the net welfare of society. In such a case the agreement would
172. The senario set forth in the text assumes that the decision of the OEMs was the
result of the exercise of power by Kodak over the OEMs. It is also possible that Kodak lacked
power over the OEMs and obtained the exclusive agreement merely by paying the OEMs for
it. In such a case, the agreement would not reduce the welfare of the OEMs and may be
efficient.
173. The other parties to the parts and service relationships are the customers. The
customers welfare was reduced since they were prevented from purchasing service from the
ISOs who they preferred. See supra text accompanying note 115.
174. See supra text accompanying note 171.
175. The OEMs may have been able to extract a higher price or other concessions from
Kodak in exchange for the agreement to sell exclusively to it. There is no assurance, however,
that the OEMs would be able to extract concessions equal to their entire welfare loss. This
would depend both on the relationship between the OEMs' costs and prices and on the relative
power of Kodak and the OEMs. The scenario set forth in the text assumes that Kodak's
conduct was the result of its power.
176. The welfare gain to Kodak was already accounted for by the offsetting welfare loss
to the ISOs.
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be neither predatory nor efficient. It would be an example of conduct
which forces a third party into an inefficient, non-predatory choice of
dealing either solely with a monopolist or solely with others. It is an
inefficient choice since it reduces the net welfare of society and it is
not predatory since it maximizes the welfare of the monopolist in the
present without requiring any impact on monopoly power.
The third category of conduct which Kodak undertook 'restricted
the equipment owners. Kodak refused to sell parts to equipment
owners who purchased service from ISOs. Like Kodak's refusal to
sell parts to ISOs and its agreement with OEMs restricting sales of
parts to ISOs, this category of conduct could be neither efficient nor
predatory. Like Kodak's other conduct, its refusal to sell parts to
equipment owners who bought service from ISOs was probably not
predatory. This refusal would be predatory if its profit maximizing
nature depended on an impact on Kodak's monopoly power. It seems
much more likely that the profit maximizing nature of the refusal
depended only on an increase in Kodak's service business. Some
equipment owners who could not do their own service bought service
previously from ISOs. These owners would now buy their service
from Kodak. Kodak's service business would increase. Thus, the
profit maximizing nature of refusing to sell parts to equipment own-
ers who bought service from ISOs did not depend on increasing Ko-
dak's power over price. Therefore, the refusal was not predatory."'
Kodak's refusal to sell parts to equipment owners who bought
service from ISOs may also not have been efficient. The refusal in-
creased Kodak's welfare by increasing its service business. This in-
crease in Kodak's welfare, however, was offset by a corresponding
decrease in the welfare of ISOs which lost all of the business which
Kodak gained. This offset creates a wash. The welfare of the equip-
ment owners, however, also decreased. When the equipment owners
had the choice of buying both parts and service from Kodak or buy-
ing parts from Kodak and service from ISOs, they chose the latter.
Kodak's new policy deprived the equipment owners of their pre-
ferred alternative and forced them to purchase both parts and service
from Kodak. This reduced the welfare of the equipment owners.
Since no welfare gain offset this welfare loss, the net welfare of soci-
ety declined. Kodak's conduct was therefore not efficient.
Kodak's refusal to sell parts to equipment owners who pur-
177. The fact that Kodak's monopoly power may have increased does not change the
conclusion stated in the text. An act which increases monopoly power is not predatory if it
would have been a profit maximizing act without such increase in power. See supra text
accompanying note 167.
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chased service from ISOs was neither predatory nor efficient. It was
a decision by a monopolist to force its customers into dealing solely
with it or solely with others. While this strategy was not predatory
because it was profit maximizing in the present without regard to an
effect on Kodak's monopoly power, it was not efficient because it
caused the net welfare of society to decline.
In summary, Kodak engaged in three different categories of
conduct and each of these categories may be neither predatory nor
efficient. The existence of conduct which is neither predatory nor
efficient destroys the efficiency-predation dichotomy. The efficiency-
predation dichotomy formed the basis of the Supreme Court's ap-
proach to the conduct element of the monopolization offense of Sec-
tion 2. Without this dichotomy another approach to the conduct ele-
ment must be developed.
V. A STANDARD OF ILLEGAL MONOPOLIZING CONDUCT WHICH
DOES NOT DEPEND UPON THE EFFICIENCY-PREDATION
DICHOTOMY
In light of the failure of the efficiency-predation dichotomy, an
alternative standard of illegal monopolizing conduct must be found.
Perhaps predation and efficiency are not two mutually inconsistent
halves of a dichotomy which defines the universe of conduct by a
monopolist, but rather one or the other defines a standard of illegal-
ity. Two possible standards would flow from this premise. First, pre-
dation might be adopted as a standard of illegality. Under this stan-
dard only predatory conduct would be illegal and all other conduct,
whether efficient or not, would be lawful. The second possible stan-
dard would judge all conduct by monopolists on the basis of effi-
ciency. Under this standard all efficient conduct would be lawful,
while all other conduct, whether predatory or not, would be
unlawful.
If either of these two standards were adopted, the types of con-
duct discussed in the preceding Part IV would as a group all be
either legal or illegal. This is because all such conduct was neither
predatory nor efficient. Thus, if only predatory conduct were illegal,
the conduct discussed in Part IV would be lawful since none of it
was predatory. A newspaper monopolist facing a new radio station
would be able to force advertisers into choosing between advertising
solely on the radio or solely in the newspaper, so long as the result of
[Vol. 33
MONOPOLIZING CONDUCT
that forced choice presently maximized the monopolist's profits.178 A
skiing monopolist would be able to force skiers into a similar choice
under similar conditions. 79 A monopolist of parts and service would
be able to coerce equipment owners into dealing only with it.' 80 The
conduct of neither the newspaper, the skiing company, nor the parts
and service monopolist would be predatory if it presently maximized
profits. Alternatively, if only efficient conduct by a monopolist was
lawful, the conduct discussed in Part IV would all be illegal since
none of it was efficient. If a monopolist boxing promoter owned the
best arena, a refusal to share access to the arena with other boxing
promoters would be illegal.' If one supplier of telex machines pos-
sessing a related monopoly already had a sales force calling on po-
tential customers, a refusal to share access to that sales force with a
rival would be illegal." 2 If a skiing monopolist refused to share ac-
cess to its facilities with a rival by including the rival in a multi-day
ticket, that refusal would be illegal.18 3 If a parts and service monopo-
list refused to sell parts to its rivals in the service business, that re-
fusal would be unlawful." 4 Each of these refusals is inefficient and
would, therefore, be illegal. Choosing between standards based solely
on predation or solely on efficiency is not necessary, however.
A preferable standard of conduct for monopolists would con-
demn all predatory conduct, allow all efficient conduct and determine
the legality of conduct which is neither predatory nor efficient on
some other basis. The roots of such a standard are found in Learned
Hand's opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America .1 5
There Judge Hand was torn between two standards. The first would
condemn virtually all monopolists by requiring passivity.' 6 The sec-
ond would allow a monopolist to engage in ordinary competitive acts
178. See discussion of Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951), supra
text accompanying notes 126-33.
179. See discussion of Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585
(1984), supra text accompanying notes 152-54.
180. See discussion of Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct.
2072 (1992), supra text accompanying notes 170-77.
181. See discussion of International Boxing Club, Inc. v. United States; 358 U.S. 242
(1959), supra text accompanying notes 136-39.
182. See discussion of Olympia Equipment Leasing Co. vs. Western Union Tel. Co.,
797 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 934 (1987), supra text accompanying
notes 140-48.
183. See discussion of Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585
(1984), supra text accompanying notes 155-59.
184. See discussion of Eastman Kodak, supra text accompanying notes 162-69.
185. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
186. See supra text accompanying note 18.
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despite the adverse impact on rivals.'" 7 Realizing that the second of
these two approaches "may expose the public to the evils of monop-
oly,"' 8 Judge Hand chose the standard requiring passivity.' Hav-
ing concluded that the conduct element legalizes monopolies which
cause the net welfare of society to be reduced, Judge Hand chose a
standard which virtually eliminates the element.
Judge Bork and the Supreme Court seek to avoid the unpleas-
ant choice between a standard which condemns almost all monopo-
lies and a standard which allows harmful monopolies to persist.
Their attempt to avoid this choice is based upon the efficiency-preda-
tion dichotomy. If the universe of conduct by monopolists could be
divided into hemispheres consisting of the efficient and the predatory,
the conduct element could allow efficient conduct while condemning
predatory conduct. As Part IV demonstrates, the efficiency-predation
dichotomy fails and, thus, cannot serve as the basis for the conduct
element. This failure returns the analysis to the choice facing Judge
Hand in Alcoa.' 90
Judge Hand could not bring himself to apply the conduct ele-
ment in any substantive form because of his realization that harmful
monopolies would result. Judge Hand failed to realize that he had
fallen into the trap which has ensnared courts and commentators for
decades. This trap is the assumption that both elements of the mo-
nopolization offense serve the same purpose, i.e. efficiency. If effi-
ciency was the only purpose to be served, the conduct element, which
legalizes some monopolies, would not exist. The power element, de-
fining harmful monopolies, would be sufficient. Monopolies are con-
demned to advance efficiency. The conduct element legalizes some
monopolies for some other purpose.
Judge Hand stated this purpose when he set forth the alterna-
tive standard which he ultimately rejected.
A single producer may be the survivor out of a group of active
competitors, merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and
industry. In such cases a strong argument can be made that,
although, the result may expose the public to the evils of mo-
nopoly, the Act does not mean to condemn the resultant of those
very forces which it is its prime object to foster: finis opus
coronat. The successful competitor, having been urged to com-
187. See supra text accompanying note 19.
188. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at 430.
189. See supra notes 22, 24 and accompanying text.
190. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416.
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pete, must not be turned upon when he wins.' 9
It is the purpose of the conduct element to legalize monopolies which
engage only in ordinary competitive acts. The statute was designed
to foster ordinary competitive acts and must not condemn a firm
which engages only in such acts, even if the firm has obtained and
retained monopoly power by means of such acts.
An interpretation of the conduct element which allowed ordi-
nary competitive acts would treat as lawful any act by a monopolist
in which a firm in a competitive market would engage.192 Such a
standard would condemn predatory behavior, allow efficient behavior
and distinguish among acts which were neither predatory nor effi-
cient. An ordinary competitive act is not predatory. Since firms in
competitive markets do not obtain monopoly power, no rational firm
intentionally foregoes profits now in order to extract monopoly prof-
its later. Such profits are not available in a competitive market.
Thus, a standard of illegal monopolizing conduct which allowed or-
dinary competitive acts would condemn predatory behavior. A stan-
dard of illegal monopolizing conduct which allowed ordinary com-
petitive acts would allow efficient acts. Firms in a competitive market
compete by improved efficiency. Such firms gain by offering an im-
proved combination of price and quality while operating within their
costs. 9 ' Thus, such conduct would be lawful under a standard al-
lowing ordinary competitive acts by a monopolist. 94
A standard which allowed a monopolist to engage in ordinary
competitive acts would allow a monopolist to refuse to share access to
its resources so long as the refusal was not predatory. This is true
even if such a refusal would be inefficient. A firm in a competitive
market does not ordinarily share with rivals access to resources it has
acquired. Such a firm usually maximizes profits by using its re-
sources to compete with its rivals and would lose profits by sharing
access. As discussed in Part IV, a refusal by a monopolist to share
access to resources may be inefficient. 9 ' A standard allowing ordi-
nary competitive acts would allow such an inefficient refusal to share
191. Id. at 430.
192. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 279-85 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980) (holding that a monopolist may refrain from notify-
ing competitors of impending product developments).
193. Costs include a return on invested capital.
194. It is, of course, possible that an improved combination of price and quality might
be predatory if it causes a monopolist to forego revenues now in the hopes of gaining monopoly
profits later. Such predatory conduct would be illegal under a standard allowing only ordinary
competitive acts.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 134-35.
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access so long as the refusal was not predatory. Thus, under this
standard a monopolist boxing promoter who owned the best arena
could lawfully refuse to share access to the arena with other promot-
ers. "'96 Similarly, a supplier of telex machines possessing a related
monopoly could refuse to share access to its sales force with a rival
supplier.' 97 Such refusals to share access to resources, if not preda-
tory, would constitute ordinary competitive acts even though they
may not be efficient. 1" A standard which allowed a monopolist to
engage in ordinary competitive acts would condemn a monopolist
which forced a third party into an inefficient choice of dealing solely
with it or solely with a rival. A firm in a competitive market could
not force a third party into such an inefficient choice. Competitors
sometimes enter into requirements or output contracts under which
customers buy solely from one source or sellers sell solely to one
buyer. Such contracts, however, differ from inefficient all or nothing
choices compelled by monopolists. Requirements and output con-
tracts entered into in a competitive market are not inefficient. In a
competitive market the third party would have no incentive to accept
the terms of a requirements or output contract unless it gained an
advantage. If the contract offered no advantage to the third party it
would turn to another firm which did not impose the requirements
or output condition. Only a monopolist could force a third party into
an inefficient all or nothing choice.199 A standard of conduct allowing
ordinary competitive acts would condemn a monopolist for forcing a
third party into an inefficient choice of dealing solely with the mo-
nopolist or solely with a rival. Thus, such a standard would con-
demn a newspaper monopolist facing a new radio station if the
newspaper forced advertisers into choosing between advertising
solely on the radio or solely in the newspaper when a mix of media
was more efficient. 20 0
Applying a standard allowing monopolists to engage in ordinary
196. See discussion of International Boxing Club, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242
(1959), supra text accompanying notes 136-39.
197. See discussion of Olympia Equipment Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 797
F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 934 (1987), supra text accompanying notes
140-48.
198. In the context of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the standard set forth in the text
would limit the essential facilities doctrine to cases involving predatory refusals to deal. The
essential facilities doctrine as a theory separate from generally applicable theories of mono-
polizing conduct has proven difficult to justify. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 59,
T 736.1 to -.2.
199. See Rievman, supra note 83, at 444-45.
200. See discussion of Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951), supra
text accompanying notes 126-33.
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competitive acts to the facts of Aspen Skiing requires recognizing
that the defendant engaged in two separate acts. Ski Co. terminated
the joint four-mountain ticket which it previously marketed with the
plaintiff Highlands." 1 Ski Co. also adopted a pricing structure be-
tween its own three-mountain six-day ticket and its daily ticket
which created a powerful incentive to buy a six-day ticket.2" The
Court focused on the termination of the joint four-mountain ticket
and attempted to apply the efficiency-predation dichotomy. 3
A standard allowing ordinary competitive acts would allow the
termination of the joint four-mountain ticket. The four-mountain
ticket was a means by which Ski Co. had shared access to its three
mountains with Highlands. When Ski Co. terminated the joint ticket
it was refusing to continue to share access to its resources. Such a
refusal, if not predatory, is an ordinary competitive act. In a compet-
itive market firms do not share their resources with rivals. Thus, the
termination of the joint four-mountain ticket would be upheld as an
ordinary competitive act.
Ski Co.'s pricing structure would be condemned by a standard
allowing ordinary competitive acts. Ski. Co. heavily discounted its
six-day three-mountain ticket off the price of six daily tickets. 0 4
This discount created a powerful incentive to purchase the six-day
ticket. This incentive caused some skiers who would have preferred
to purchase some of their skiing from Ski Co. and some from High-
lands to purchase all of their skiing from Ski Co. This coerced, all or
nothing choice reduced the welfare of skiers. This reduction in the
welfare of skiers was not offset by other welfare gains and resulted
in a net reduction in the welfare of society.2 5 This inefficient coerced
choice would be condemned by a standard allowing ordinary compet-
itive acts since a firm in a competitive market would lack the power
to coerce such a choice.
Applying a standard allowing a monopolist to engage in ordi-
nary competitive acts to the facts assumed by the Court in Eastman
Kodak2" 6 requires recognizing that Kodak engaged in three different
categories of conduct. Kodak refused to sell parts to ISOs. Kodak
refused to sell parts to equipment owners who bought service from
ISOs. Finally, Kodak agreed with other manufacturers of parts
201. See supra text accompanying notes 42-46.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 70-84.
204. See supra text accompanying note 57.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 154-55.
206. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
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(OEMs) that they would sell parts which fit Kodak equipment only
to Kodak.
A standard of conduct which allowed ordinary competitive acts
would allow Kodak to refuse to sell parts to ISOs.20 7 Kodak had
previously shared access to its parts manufacturing capacity with
ISOs by selling parts to them. Its refusal to continue selling parts to
ISOs constituted a refusal to continue to share this access to its man-
ufacturing capacity. Such a refusal, if not predatory, is an ordinary
competitive act. Firms in a competitive market do not ordinarily
share access to their resources with rivals. Instead, they use those
resources to compete. Thus, the refusal to sell parts to ISOs is an
ordinary competitive act and should be lawful even if inefficient.
A standard of conduct which allowed ordinary competitive acts
would condemn Kodak's conduct coercing equipment owners into not
buying service from ISOs. Kodak refused to sell parts to equipment
owners if they bought service from ISOs. This refusal forced equip-
ment owners into choosing to deal solely with Kodak or solely with
ISOs. Since Kodak could supply both parts and service and ISOs
could supply only service, equipment owners chose to deal solely
with Kodak. This coerced choice reduced the welfare of the equip-
ment owners without any offsetting increase in welfare and was thus
inefficient.2"' A standard allowing ordinary competitive acts would
condemn such an inefficient coerced choice because a firm in a com-
petitive market would not have the power to coerce such an ineffi-
cient choice.
A standard of conduct which allowed ordinary competitive acts
would condemn Kodak's agreement with OEMs denying parts to
ISOs if that agreement was the result of market power over the
OEMs.. 9 or if it was a profit maximizing strategy only because of
Kodak's monopoly power in the parts or service markets. The agree-
ment between Kodak and the OEMs may have been the result of
market power which Kodak had over the OEMs as a large buyer.
The use of such monopsonistic power would be condemned by a
standard which allowed only ordinary competitive acts. Ordinary
competitors do not have monopsonistic power.
It is possible, however, that Kodak had no monopsonistic power
over the OEMs. If the OEMs could easily manufacture other pro-
207. The statement in the text assumes that the refusal was not predatory. A firm in a
competitive market has no incentive to engage in predatory behavior.
208. See supra text following note 177.
209. The power of a buyer over a seller is referred to as monopsonistic power or mo-
nopsony. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1107 (6th ed. 1990).
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ucts, the market in which they operated would include many custom-
ers other than Kodak and Kodak would then not have monopsonistic
power. If Kodak lacked monopsonistic power over the OEMs some
other reason must explain the OEMs acquiescence in the agreement.
The agreement caused the OEMs to give up their previous relation-
ship with the ISOs and if it was not the result of monopsonistic
power they must have received something in return. The simplest
explanation is that Kodak paid the OEMs for the exclusive dealing
condition. Even a buyer without monopsonistic power can pay a
supplier for an exclusive dealing contract. The remaining question is
how purchasing this exclusive dealing condition would benefit Ko-
dak. There are three posibilities.
Purchasing the exclusive dealing condition from the OEMs may
have been a predatory act. It may have been designed as a present
expenditure to gain future monopoly profits. In such a case, the ex-
clusive dealing condition would have been profit maximizing only
because the ISOs would exit the service market leaving Kodak with
increased monopoly power and profits. A predatory act would, of
course, be condemned by a standard allowing only ordinary competi-
tive acts. Ordinary competitors have no incentive to engage in preda-
tory acts.
Purchasing the exclusive dealing condition from OEMs may
have been an. efficient act. Exclusive dealing sometimes increases effi-
ciency, for example, by facilitating the exchange of trade secret infor-
mation."10 Efficient exclusive dealing agreements are especially likely
if the parties are small parts of their respective markets. A standard
which allowed only ordinary competitive acts would allow an effi-
cient exclusive .dealing contract. Ordinary competitors advance their
interests by engaging in efficient acts.
The exclusive dealing agreement between Kodak and the
OEMs may have been neither predatory nor efficient. The agree-
ment may not have been predatory if it was presently profit maxi-
mizing without an impact on Kodak's monopoly power and may not
have been efficient if it reduced the net welfare of society.2"' In such
a case, Kodak entered into the agreement for a non-predatory profit
maximizing reason, i.e. to increase unit sales of parts and service.
Under a standard allowing only ordinary competitive acts, the re-
maining question is whether this would be a profit maximizing strat-
210. A firm possessing trade secret information may be more willing to share it with a
parts supplier if the firm knows that the parts supplier is contractually bound not only to keep
the information secret but also from even dealing with competitors.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 170-76.
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egy for a firm in a competitive market. A non-predatory, inefficient,
exclusive dealing agreement would make it more difficult for the
ISOs to sell service. This in turn would increase Kodak's profits by
increasing unit sales of parts and/or service. Kodak would be confi-
dent that the equipment owners formerly serviced by the ISOs would
turn to it for service since no other service provider could survive.212
This is obviously a strategy which would not work for a firm in a
competitive market. In a competitive market an exclusive dealing
agreement between a single buyer and a single seller would not de-
prive other buyers of a source of supply. Furthermore, if a single
buyer were put out of business by an exclusive dealing contract be-
tween another buyer and one or more sellers, the customers formerly
served by that buyer would not necessarily turn to the beneficiary of
the exclusive dealing condition. Thus, in a competitive market, a
firm would engage in an exclusive dealing contract only for advanced
efficiency. Therefore, a standard of conduct which allowed a monop-
olist to engage solely in ordinary competitive acts would allow a mo-
nopolist to engage in efficient exclusive dealing contracts and con-
demn all others whether predatory or not.
A standard of monopolizing conduct which allowed ordinary
competitive acts would legalize efficient acts, condemn predatory acts,
and legalize inefficient behavior which a firm in a competitive mar-
ket would find possible and profit maximizing. The statute was
designed to encourage ordinary competitive acts and should allow
such acts even if they are inefficient in a particular circumstance.
2 13
VI. CONCLUSION
The source of much of the conceptual confusion about the con-
duct element of the monopolization offense is the assumption that
both elements of the offense rest on the same basis, i.e. avoiding the
social cost of monopoly. This assumption is erroneous. The power
element of the monopolization offense is designed to identify firms
212. In order to survive, a service provider would need to obtain the parts previously
produced by Kodak and the OEMs.
213. It would be possible to assert an efficiency basis for allowing inefficient ordinary
competitive acts such as refusing to share access to resources. Such an assertion would be based
upon the fear that condemning such inefficient acts would deter efficient behavior, such as
creating resources in the first place. However, in reaching their conclusion that substantial,
persistent monopoly should be subject to governmental injunctive relief without proof of culpa-
ble conduct, Areeda and Turner concluded that the benefits of ending such monopolies out-
weighed possible negative effects on incentives to produce. 3 AREEDA & TURNFR, supra note
10, 622. The position taken in the text does not depend upon the calculus of determining
whether the inefficient acts allowed are offset by the efficient acts encouraged.
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with the capacity to impose social costs by reducing output and rais-
ing prices. The conduct element, however, exists to legalize some of
these monopolies despite the social costs which they impose.
The efficiency-predation dichotomy advocated by Judge Bork
and adopted by the Supreme Court is an attempt to avoid this con-
clusion. This attempt fails. The efficiency-predation dichotomy as-
serts that all conduct by a monopolist is either predatory or efficient.
If this were true, the conduct element could condemn monopolies
which engage in predatory conduct, while legalizing monopolies
which survive only by being more efficient than rivals. Such an ap-
proach would avoid the conclusion that the conduct element legalizes
some monopolies which impose social cost by concluding that any
monopoly not engaged in predation is more efficient than its rivals
and thus does not impose social costs.
Part IV of this article demonstrates the failure of the efficiency-
predation dichotomy. The efficiency-predation dichotomy is based on
the fallacy that any act which presently maximizes the profit of the
monopolist without an impact on monopoly power, and therefore is
not predatory under Judge Bork's definition, is efficient. Some acts
by monopolists, however, are presently profit maximizing without
impacting monopoly power while reducing the net welfare of society.
Such conduct is neither predatory nor efficient. Thus, the efficiency-
predation dichotomy fails and cannot be used as a basis for a conduct
element which would discrimate between socially costly and socially
beneficial monopolies.
Accepting the conclusion that the conduct element legalizes
some monopolies which impose social costs allows examination of the
basis for this element. The conduct element legalizes monopolies
which engage in ordinary competitive acts because the Act was
designed to encourage such acts. As Learned Hand stated, "[tihe suc-
cessful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned
upon when he wins."2 14 Ordinary competitive acts are usually, but
not always, efficient. Such acts are never predatory.
In summary, the conduct element of the monopolization offense
cannot be based on the failed efficiency-predation dichotomy. Rather,
the conduct element is based on a policy of encouraging ordinary
competitive acts.
214. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (1945).
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